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FOREWORD
Within the international tax competition background, capital taxation has received much at-
tention in the last decades. From an economic perspective, investment should be located in
the most productive jurisdiction; however, it is located where tax rates are lower. Corporations
locate in the lowest tax jurisdiction forcing governments to cut taxes to compete for mobile cap-
ital and, hence, inducing to a decrease in tax revenues. In the new era of economic integration
and increasing capital mobility – that is, the economic globalization – tax competition is more
evident than before, leading what is called the race to the bottom, reducing the welfare state
and providing inefficiently low tax rates and public goods. Consequently, the tax burden has
been transferred from the mobile capital taxation to the more immobile factors such as taxes
on labor, exacerbating labor market rigidities and unemployment. Furthermore, the existence
of fiscal strategic interactions among countries and their implications on the race to the bot-
tom phenomenon is another interesting issue discussed within the international tax competition
context. Each government mimics the fiscal policy applied by its neighboring countries, either
because the tax competition, spillovers, or the yardstick competition.
As a response of the increasing fiscal competition among governments, both politicians and
economists have advocated for the coordination of capital tax rates to reduce the associated in-
efficiencies and welfare costs. It is generally recognized that global tax harmonization is difficult
to achieve since global negotiations toward coordinating international capital taxation has not
took effect. For example, the European Union (EU) member states have made a lot of proposals
for coordination, however, some countries would prefer the tax competition outcome rather than
the global coordination if compensatory transfers are not allowed in the agreement.1 Conse-
1Asymmetries between jurisdictions exacerbate the difficulty for achieving harmonization since the low-
productive jurisdiction is better off under the fiscal competition than with the harmonized tax rate.
xi
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quently, the debate has been focused on the desirability of tax coordination among a coalition
of countries, i.e., on partial tax harmonization.
The literature on tax harmonization has devoted surprisingly little attention to defining
this phenomenon although there have been lot of proposals for corporate tax harmonization
among EU members. Definitions of tax harmonization eliminate coordination of decentralized
economies, where different levels of governments (e.g. federal, state, and local) impose taxes
on the same tax base. Rather, it encompasses the large class of models of (horizontal) tax
coordination, under which governments at the same level are coordinating their taxes. Partial
tax harmonization is described in this thesis as a cooperative tax setting among a coalition of
jurisdictions where commitment are credible. Such agreement consist in deciding a common
capital tax rate that maximizes the joint welfare of the tax coalition and it is formed when it is
beneficial for each of its members. Consequently, jurisdictions give up parts of their autonomy in
tax matters. Therefore, this definition is broader and includes the coordination of decentralized
economies.
Most of the literature on partial tax harmonization has assumed that jurisdictions only com-
pete in taxes, but there are some authors who have analyzed general tax competition in which
jurisdictions compete in tax and nontax instruments (e.g., infrastructure investments). This
assumption is particularly relevant because, in fact, EU countries are discussing the coordina-
tion of capital taxation and, simultaneously, are involved in the coordination of other nontax
instruments that affect the allocation of capital goods.
The first chapter analyzes how partial tax harmonization within a coalition of asymmetric
jurisdictions is influenced by a simultaneous coordination of infrastructure investments. For this
purpose, we use the tax competition model, conceding a subset of jurisdictions to form a tax
coalition. Moreover, asymmetries in productivity levels between jurisdictions are allowed. Two
kinds of infrastructure coordination are considered: infrastructure coordination with jurisdiction-
specific investments and through the choice of a common investment level. The main results of
the chapter can be summarized as follows. First, partial tax harmonization can be welfare en-
hancing for tax coalition members whenever they are not too different in their productivity levels.
Second, tax harmonization becomes feasible when tax coalition members dispose of additional
instruments for the coordination of tax and nontax policies even if productivity asymmetries
between them are substantial. Therefore, productivity asymmetries represent a serious hand-
icap for partial tax harmonization that can be remedied by coordinating nontax instruments
xii
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when they allow reducing these asymmetries. Finally, infrastructure coordination through the
choice of a common investment level is particularly indicated when asymmetries between poten-
tial members of a tax coalition are large. However, infrastructure coordination does not always
facilitate partial tax harmonization. The current usage of structural funds orientated to reduce
regional infrastructure deficits is therefore suitable to facilitate tax harmonization within the
EU.
The second chapter considers partial tax harmonization as a strategic response to interna-
tional tax competition in a more general setting where a country can also be a fiscally decentral-
ized economy. We analyze a country’s optimal fiscal strategy in the context of international (and
national) tax competition. For this purpose, we build on the tax competition models, allowing
a subset of centralized jurisdictions to form a tax coalition. Countries are also asymmetric in
productivity levels but characterized by multilevel government such that there is both horizontal
and vertical tax competition. Three strategies are considered: i) fiscal centralization under which
the central government decides all tax rates in the country; ii) fiscal decentralization under which
central and local governments choose independently their capital tax rates; and iii) partial tax
harmonization under which two countries form a tax union that commonly determines a unique
tax rate for all jurisdictions. The main result from the analysis is that fiscal decentralization is
a handicap in achieving partial tax harmonization. Thus, it is shown that tax harmonization
is more difficult to achieve in fiscally decentralized economies with high levels of productivity.
This result is confirmed by recent data and explains the observed difficulties in achieving capital
tax harmonization in the EU.
The last chapter investigates the existence of international tax competition among OECD
countries, considering the importance of combating the “harmful” tax practices. We address the
question whether or not fiscal interactions between governments exist and whether governments
with similar public infrastructure investment levels increase the fiscal interdependence among
them. For this purpose, we use a spatial panel data model. Results reveal the existence of tax
interdependence in the closest neighboring OECD countries where international tax competition
still occurs. The tax interdependence is higher for countries with similar public infrastructure
investment levels. Therefore, the hypothesis that countries with similar public infrastructure
investment levels incur in higher fiscal interactions is accepted.
Each chapter is independent of the rest but all together are connected by the same tax
competition literature. For this reason, each begins with an introduction and ends with the
xiii
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main conclusions that are reached on the basis of its content. The references, appendices,
figures and tables, if any, are added at the end of each chapter.
xiv
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CHAPTER 1
PARTIAL TAX HARMONIZATION THROUGH INFRASTRUCTURE
COORDINATION
Overview. This chapter analyzes the role of infrastructure coordination
in facilitating partial tax harmonization within a coalition of asymmetric
jurisdictions. Two main results are obtained. First, productivity asym-
metries represent a serious handicap for partial tax harmonization that
can be remedied by coordinating nontax instruments when they allow re-
ducing these asymmetries. Second, infrastructure coordination through
the choice of a common investment level is particularly indicated when
asymmetries between potential members of a tax coalition are large. The
current usage of structural funds orientated to reduce regional infrastruc-
ture deficits is therefore suitable to facilitate tax harmonization within the
European Union.
Keywords: Partial Tax Harmonization; Infrastructure Coordination; EU
Structural Funds Policy
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Since the 1980s processes of economic integration have increased the international mobility of
capital to an extent never observed before. This has led to a race to the bottom in capital taxation
among developed countries as can be observed in Fig. 1.1 for European Union (EU) member
countries. The result of this tendency are inefficiently low tax rates (Zodrow and Mieszkowski,
1986; Wilson, 1986; Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991).1 As a consequence, and to maintain the
existing welfare standards, the tax burden has been shifted from capital towards labor which
has raised growing concern in many countries.2 Both politicians and economists have therefore
advocated for the coordination of capital taxation to reduce the associated efficiency and welfare
costs (Keen, 1987; Bucovetsky, 1991; Kanbur and Keen, 1993; Fuest and Huber, 2001; Baldwin
and Krugman, 2004; Sørensen, 2004; Konrad, 2009; Devereux and Fuest, 2010; Keen and Konrad,
2013).3 Since global tax harmonization, however, is difficult to achieve the recent debate has
focused on the desirability of tax coordination among a coalition of countries, i.e., on partial
tax harmonization (Burbidge et al., 1997; Konrad and Schjelderup, 1999; Beaudry et al., 2000;
Brøchner et al., 2007; Conconi et al., 2008; Bucovetsky, 2009; Bettendorf et al., 2010; Vrijburg
and de Mooij, 2010; Eichner and Pething, 2013).4
While most of the literature on partial tax harmonization has assumed that jurisdictions only
compete in taxes, in this chapter, we consider competition in further nontax instruments (e.g.,
infrastructure investments).5 Thereby we allow jurisdictions not only to coordinate their tax
rates but also their nontax instruments. This is particularly relevant because we observe that
countries that are discussing the coordination of capital taxation, simultaneously, are involved in
the coordination of other nontax instruments that affect the allocation of capital goods.6 Thus,
1See Wilson (1999), Wilson and Wildasin (2004), and Boadway and Tremblay (2011) for a review of the tax
competition literature.
2For example, in EU member countries, the implicit average tax on capital has decreased from 44% in 1980 to
35% in 1994 while the implicit tax on labor has increased from 34% to 40.5% during the same period (European
Commission, 1996).
3See Dankó (2012) regarding the proposals for corporate tax harmonization in the EU.
4Keuschnigg et al. (2014) define tax coordination and harmonization in the EU as follows: “tax coordination
refers to a cooperative tax setting, where countries or a group of them build on domestic tax systems to render
them compatible with the aims of the Union as formulated the Treaty on the European Union. Consequently,
countries deliberately give up parts of their autonomy in tax matters”. Moreover, “harmonization is viewed as
tighter coordination, leading to almost identical or at least similar tax systems, tax bases and tax rates within a
Union”.
5Notice, however, that some authors have analyzed general tax competition in which jurisdictions compete in
tax and nontax instruments. See, for example, Hindriks et al. (2008), Zissimos and Wooders (2008) or Pieretti
and Zanaj (2011).
6For example, it has been shown that infrastructure investments rise international capital mobility by attract-
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Combined corporate income tax rate of EU countries (period 1995-2011)
Figure 1.1: Countries are classified into high, middle and low income countries. High income
countries comprise Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Swe-
den, and United Kingdom. Middle income countries include Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal.
Low income countries encompass Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
and Poland. Source: Own calculation based on OECD (2015).
in the EU for instance, a major part of public infrastructure investments is financed via structural
funds. Similarly, while state governments in the United States (US) have discretionary power
on setting capital taxes, at the same time, the federal government partly decides over their
infrastructure investments. Against this background, the aim of this chapter is to assess the
impact of nontax instruments in achieving a partial harmonization of capital tax rates.
For this purpose, we use the tax competition model developed by Zodrow and Mieszkowski
(1986) and Wilson (1986) in which we allow a subset of jurisdictions to form a tax coalition, as in
Konrad and Schjelderup (1999). The framework of Konrad and Schjelderup (1999) is modified
by allowing for asymmetries in productivity levels between jurisdictions and by assuming that
governments make infrastructure investments that enhance the productivity of private firms. For
the sake of simplicity, the focus is on three jurisdictions that differ in their productivity levels.
The timing of the game is as follows. In stage 1, jurisdictions 1 and 2 decide whether to coordinate
tax rates and infrastructure investments, where commitments are assumed to be credible. In
stage 2, jurisdictions simultaneously decide their infrastructure investments. Finally, in stage
3, after observing the different investment levels, each jurisdiction simultaneously chooses its
capital tax rate.7
ing foreign capital (Bjorvatn and Schjelderup, 2002; Justman et al., 2002; Benassy-Quéré et al., 2007; Hindriks
et al., 2008; Zissimos and Wooders, 2008; Pieretti and Zanaj, 2011).
7The assumption that jurisdictions first choose infrastructure investments and then tax rates is common in
3
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Regarding the scope of the cooperation agreements between jurisdictions 1 and 2 we study
three cases. First, the two jurisdictions coordinate their tax rates while setting infrastructure
investment levels separately. We follow part of the literature in assuming that such a partial
tax harmonization agreement consists in deciding a common capital tax rate that maximizes
the joint welfare (Burbidge et al., 1997; Konrad and Schjelderup, 1999; Fuest and Huber, 2001;
Conconi et al., 2008; Bucovetsky, 2009; Kammas and Philippopouslos, 2010; Eggert and Itaya,
2014; Han et al., 2017).8 A tax coalition is formed when it is beneficial for each of its members.9
Second, jurisdictions 1 and 2 choose a common capital tax rate and furthermore coordinate
their infrastructure investments. The investment levels are allowed to be different and are
chosen to maximize the joint welfare. This case mimics the situation of decentralized economies
such as the US, for example. Third, both jurisdictions agree on a common tax rate and a
common level of infrastructure investments. This case is particularly relevant as it resembles the
infrastructure policy followed in the EU where structural funds are used to reduce asymmetries
in infrastructure investments among EU members. To see this, take a look at the per capita
infrastructure investment in EU member countries displayed in Fig. 1.2. We find that per capita
infrastructure investment among high, middle and low income countries has nearly converged
in 2008.10 This tendency is not accidental but is due to EU structural funds that amounted
to a total of 100.5 billion euro during the period 2000-06. Thus, in Fig. 1.3 we observe that a
substantial number of total infrastructure investments in middle and low income countries were
financed by the EU which in Greece, for example, amounted to more than 70%. 11
From the analysis two central messages emerge. First, productivity asymmetries represent
a serious handicap for partial tax harmonization that can be remedied by coordinating nontax
instruments when they allow to reduce these asymmetries. The results indicate that both kinds
of infrastructure coordination, jurisdiction-specific and with a common investment level, are
suitable for this purpose. A necessary condition for the effectiveness of such an infrastructure
the literature (Hindriks et al., 2008; Zissimos and Wooders, 2008; Pieretti and Zanaj, 2011; Han et al., 2017) and
motivated by the irreversibility of the former decision.
8Notice, in some studies partial tax harmonization consists in agreeing upon a minimum tax rate (Kanbur
and Keen, 1993; Peralta and Ypersele, 2006; Konrad, 2009; Osterloh, 2013; Keen and Konrad, 2013).
9We thereby assume that side-payments between coalition partners are not feasible. See Keen and Konrad
(2013) Section 3.3, for a discussion of the literature on coordination among a subset of countries.
10After the financial crisis in that year, however, we witness a divergence of per capita investments as low and
middle income countries have reduced investments while high income countries have maintained the tendency of
a slight increase in yearly investments.
11Interestingly, though the objective of EU structural funds policy is manyfold, a widespread view is that this
policy leads to more intensive tax competition and that it therefore is detrimental to the achievement of a partial
tax harmonization in the EU (Becker and Fuest, 2010).
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Transport infrastructure investment per capita of EU countries (period 1995-2011)
Figure 1.2: For country classification see Figure 1.1. Measurement: Infrastructure investment
per capita in Euros. Source: Own calculation based on OECD (2015).
Share of EU financed infrastructure investment over total infrastructure
investment (period 2000-06, period 2003-06 for low income countries)
Figure 1.3: For country classification see Figure 1.1. Measurement: Infrastructure investment
per capita financed by EU divided by total per capita infrastructure investment. Source: Own
calculation based on OECD (2015) and Sweco (2008).
coordination between asymmetric jurisdictions is that the jurisdiction outside the tax coalition is
not too productive. The second message that comes up from the analysis is that infrastructure
5
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coordination through the choice of a common investment level is particularly indicated when
asymmetries between potential members of a (partial) tax coalition are large. Thus, we find
that such a coordination agreement sustains partial tax harmonization in situations in which
this is not possible with the choice of jurisdiction-specific investments. As a consequence, we
judge the current usage of EU structural funds orientated to reduce regional infrastructure
deficits as suitable to facilitate tax harmonization within the EU.
The main results of the chapter can be summarized as follows. First, partial tax harmoniza-
tion can be welfare enhancing for the jurisdictions of the partial tax coalition whenever they are
not too different in their productivity levels. This result extents the analysis of the case of sym-
metric jurisdictions by Burbidge et al. (1997) and Konrad and Schjelderup (1999). They have
shown that an increase in capital tax rates by the (partial) tax coalition partners can increase
their welfare even if it implies a capital transfer to third jurisdictions. The intuition behind
our result is that a common capital tax rate in the tax coalition means that with increasing
asymmetries capital transfers in the less productive jurisdiction become too large to compensate
the advantage of a reduction in the intensity of international tax competition.
Second, tax harmonization becomes feasible when the members of the partial tax coalition
dispose of additional instruments for the coordination of tax and nontax policies even if pro-
ductivity asymmetries between the members of the tax union are substantial. The effect of
such an enhanced coordination is a reduction infrastructure investments differences between tax
coalition members. Infrastructure coordination allows to internalize the negative externality
of overinvestment due to infrastructure competition. As a consequence, the joint coordination
of tax rates and infrastructure investments avoids the aggressive competition in infrastructure
investments and allows to obtain additional gains for both coalition members. In general terms
we can summarize this result as follows. Whenever two asymmetric parties are engaged in a
non-cooperative relationship that involves sequential strategic choices, and side-payments are
not available, achieving an agreement on a full package that involves coordination of actions at
all stages is easier than achieving an agreement on a partial package that excludes some stages
from the arrangement.
Third, infrastructure coordination does not always facilitate partial tax harmonization. This
is the case in which asymmetries both inside and outside the tax coalition are substantial.
Thus, a high productivity jurisdiction outside the tax coalition reacts more aggressively and
responds with a reduction of its capital tax rate to the tax increase of the tax coalition. The
6
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corresponding welfare cost in terms of capital outflows imposed either on the less productive
coalition member (under infrastructure coordination with jurisdiction-specific investments) or
on the more productive coalition member (under infrastructure coordination through the choice
of a common investment level) renders the mere tax harmonization preferable for them.
The analysis is related to several studies. Firstly, neglecting infrastructure investments, our
model is a simplified version of the general model of tax competition developed by Zodrow and
Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986). As formulated by Keen and Konrad (2013), in the case of
symmetric countries, “the decentralized tax-setting means that countries fail to properly exploit
what is, from the collective perspective, ..., the first best feasible”. For the more interesting case
of asymmetric countries (or jurisdictions), general results are hard to find. Therefore, further
restrictions on the functional forms of the production function and the utility function of public
goods are necessary (see e.g., Wildasin, 1991; Bucovetsky, 2009; Hindriks et al., 2008; Kempf and
Rota-Graziosi, 2010). With these simplifications the resulting best-response functions become
linear and the Nash-equilibrium can be easily derived (see Keen and Konrad (2013, 270-4).
Several insights from this model are already well-understood. Thus, capital-rich countries, more
productive countries and countries with a stronger taste for public goods will choose higher
tax rates. Furthermore, as shown by Bucovetsky (2009), under asymmetries in population size
it is the smaller country that sets lower tax rates in equilibrium. We take this model as a
reference point and analyze how endogenously chosen infrastructure investments affect partial
tax coordination within the model.
Secondly, as simultaneous tax coordination by all countries is unlikely to be established, the
literature has focused on tax coordination by a subset of countries that might be able to create
mechanisms or institutions that allow a credible commitment to maintaining jointly agreed
tax rates. Konrad and Schjelderup (1999) have shown that such a partial tax harmonization
can increase the welfare of the participating jurisdictions. This depends on the response of
jurisdictions from outside the tax coalition, and the relative size of the tax union. Thus, a
necessary condition for a welfare enhancing effect is that tax rates are strategic complements
and that jurisdictions are not too different. Brøchner et al. (2007) study partial tax coordination
in the EU, using a general equilibrium model. They conclude that corporate tax coordination
would generate a moderate overall welfare growth. However, while such a coordination would
leave some EUmember states as winners, others would lose from it. As a consequence, yielding an
agreement on tax cooperation requires compensation mechanisms. Conconi et al. (2008), apart
7
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from tax competition between governments, consider the commitment problem of governments
not to increase capital taxes once capital has been installed. Their analysis shows that with such
a commitment problem, compared to both no tax coordination and global tax harmonization,
partial tax harmonization can be welfare enhancing for all members of the tax coalition if capital
is sufficiently mobile.
Thirdly, some authors have introduced productive public goods into the general model of
tax competition. Keen and Marchand (1997) extent the standard model of fiscal competition
by assuming that governments, apart from taxes, also choose public inputs to maximize social
welfare.12 They find that simultaneous capital and infrastructure competition not only yields
inefficiently low tax rates but also inefficiently high infrastructure investments. Zissimos and
Wooders (2008) show that the intensity of tax competition can be mitigated when firms produc-
tion costs are reduced by public infrastructure investments. Becker and Fuest (2010) analyze
the effects of infrastructure coordination using a model in which countries compete for the loca-
tion of profitable firms. They find that the coordination of infrastructure investments between
two countries can mitigate tax competition between these countries. The main differences be-
tween their and our model is that we focus on partial tax harmonization, allow for asymmetries
among countries and, most importantly, consider policy responses of third countries.13 More-
over, our model is framed in the capital tax competition literature while their model belongs to
the literature on interjurisdictional competition for profitable firms.
Finally, recent studies have analyzed tax harmonization when countries also compete in
nontax instruments such as infrastructure investments. Han et al. (2017) analyze the desirability
of global tax coordination when countries compete in taxes and infrastructures. They find
that tax coordination with an additional nontax instrument is more likely to be detrimental
when countries compete simultaneously rather than sequentially since simultaneity eliminates
strategic effects between tax and nontax instruments. The main difference to this chapter is that
infrastructure investments in their analysis are not subject to coordination between jurisdictions
and that they focus on global tax harmonization instead of partial tax harmonization. Han (2013)
analyzes how infrastructure investments affect partial tax harmonization between symmetric
jurisdictions. He finds that it can harm tax coalition members as well as nonmembers which
is in contrast to the classical result that partial tax harmonization is Pareto improving in such
12Fuest (1995) finds that with a publicly provided factor of production the welfare effect of co-ordinated tax
increases becomes ambiguous.
13This last aspect is especially relevant to derive policy implications for tax harmonization in the EU which
under increasingly international capital mobility depends on global tax competition.
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a case. Here the main difference is that he also does not consider the coordination of nontax
instruments and that his analysis is limited to the case of symmetric countries.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 sets up the model and derives the
benchmarks of non-cooperation and partial tax harmonization. The main results on the impact
of infrastructure coordination in achieving a partial harmonization of capital tax rates are in
Section 1.3. Finally, Section 1.4 presents the conclusions. The proofs are in the Appendix.
1.2 The model
Consider the tax competition model developed by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson
(1986) in which, as in Konrad and Schjelderup (1999), we allow a subset of jurisdictions to form
a tax coalition. The framework is modified by allowing for asymmetries in productivity between
jurisdictions and by assuming that governments provide local public goods that enhance the
productivity of private firms. To be precise, consider N = 3 jurisdictions, indexed by i = 1, 2, 3,
each inhabited by an identical number of immobile residents with mass one who each supply
one unit of labor. In each region governments choose a rate of the source-based unit tax ti on
capital and a level of public investment gi that enhances the productivity of domestic capital.
Output in each jurisdiction is produced using capital and labor and the production function is
written in intensive form, fi(ki; gi), with the standard assumptions of f
′
i > 0, f
′′
i < 0, where ki
denotes the capital per worker employed in jurisdiction i. The total amount of capital is fixed
and normalized to 1. The initial capital stock per worker in each jurisdiction is assumed to be
symmetric, i.e., ki = 1/3. The cost of public investment is given by the convex function ci(gi),
which, for the sake of analytical tractability, is assumed to be of the form ci(gi) = g
2
i /2.
Capital is perfectly mobile between jurisdictions such that the net return to capital, ρ, is
determined by the following arbitrage condition
ρ = f ′i (ki; gi)− ti for i = 1, 2, 3. (1.1)
The government in jurisdiction i maximizes the welfare function Wi, the sum of the return
to the immobile factor and tax revenue, net of the public goods cost14
14Neglecting infrastructure investments, this is a simplified version of the more general representative consumer
utility function
Wi = fi (ki)− f ′i (ki) ki + ρki + ui(G),
where G = tiki, discussed in Keen and Konrad (2013). This utility function has been used to analyze the
9
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Wi (ti, gi) = fi (ki; gi)− f ′i (ki; gi) ki + tiki − c(gi), (1.2)
Following the literature (Hindriks et al., 2008; Bucovetsky, 2009; Hauptmeier et al., 2012;
Han, 2013; Eichner and Pething, 2013; among others), we assume a linear quadratic production
function
fi (ki; gi) = (α + ǫi + gi) ki − k2i , i = 1, 2, 3, (1.3)
where α > 0. The production function allows for asymmetric productivity levels and exhibits
decreasing returns to capital and constant returns to investment. Without loss of generality we
assume ǫ1 = 0. Moreover, to guarantee nonnegative equilibrium values, we restrict the analysis
to (ǫ2, ǫ3) ǫ R =
{




− ǫ2, 73 − 275 ǫ2
}}
.15 With this production
function, jurisdiction i’s welfare function simplifies to
Wi (ti, gi) = k
2
i + tiki − g2i /2. (1.4)
The arbitrage condition (1.1) together with the market clearing condition (
∑
ki = 1) implies





(2ǫi − ǫj − ǫh) + (2gi − gj − gh)− (2ti − tj − th)
6
, (1.5)
where i, j, h = 1, 2, 3; j 6= i; h 6= i, j.16 Regions can attract more capital by increasing their
infrastructure investments or by decreasing capital taxation. Under equal tax and investment
levels, more productive jurisdictions attract more capital.
We assume that jurisdictions 1 and 2 are able to credibly commit to a common tax rate and,
therefore, are able to form a tax coalition. A tax union is formed whenever it is beneficial for both
symmetric case. However, in the asymmetric case general results are hard to find which has led many authors
to assume quadratic production functions and a linear utility function of public goods (see Keen and Konrad,
2013, 270).
We also assume that domestic capital does not enter the welfare function. This can either be justified by
assuming that there is no domestic ownership of capital (Hindriks et al., 2008) or that tax rates are determined
by the median voter who has no capital endowment (Borck, 2003). Notice also that considering symmetric capital
ownership would not affect our results (see Keen and Konrad, 2013, 267), while the impact of asymmetric capital
ownership is already well understood (see Keen and Konrad, 2013, 270) and this additional asymmetry certainly
would divert the attention from our main results.
15As shown in the Supplementary material to this chapter, the binding restrictions to guarantee nonnegative
equilibrium values stem from tN1 > 0, t
N
3 > 0, and g
TI
1 > 0, respectively.
16When not stated otherwise, we assume these conditions for all of our further expressions.
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partners where we assume that side-payments between coalition partners are not feasible.17 Our
assumptions imply that in this case jurisdiction 2 is the more productive jurisdiction in the tax
coalition. The jurisdiction outside the tax coalition, jurisdiction 3, can be either more productive
than both members of the tax coalition (ǫ3 ≥ ǫ2), less productive than both jurisdictions (ǫ3 < 0),
or more productive than jurisdiction 1 and less productive than jurisdiction 2 (0 ≤ ǫ3 < ǫ2).
The timing of the game is as follows. First, in stage 1, jurisdictions 1 and 2 decide whether
to coordinate tax rates and infrastructure investments. Once a decision is taken, infrastruc-
ture investments are decided in stage 2. Finally, in stage 3, for a given level of infrastructure
investments, tax rates are chosen. All decisions at each stage are taken simultaneously by all
jurisdictions (and the tax coalition). The game is solved by backwards induction. The solution
concept is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE).
1.2.1 The non-cooperative game
Let us first provide as a benchmark the non-cooperative game in which each jurisdiction chooses
its infrastructure investment and capital tax rate separately. Beginning in stage 3, each juris-
diction maximizes its welfare function (1.4) with respect to the tax rate ti while taking other
rivals’ tax rates as given. The best-response functions are given by18




(2ǫi − ǫj − ǫh) + (2gi − gj − gh) + tj + th
8
(1.6)
such that tax rates of different jurisdictions are strategic complements. Furthermore, the op-
timal tax rate is increasing in the jurisdiction’s infrastructure investment (i.e., tax rates and
investments are complementary instruments) and decreasing in the infrastructure investments





2ǫi − ǫj − ǫh + 2gi − gj − gh
9
(1.7)
where the condition ∂ti/∂tj < 1 in Eq. (1.6) guarantees the stability of the equilibrium. After
substituting the above tax rates into the jurisdictions’ welfare function in (1.4), in stage 2,
jurisdiction i chooses the optimal level of infrastructure gi that maximizes its welfare. The
17See Keen and Konrad (2013) for the related literature using this assumption.
18Notice that from substitution of Eq.(1.5) in Eq.(1.4) we have that Wi is concave in ti.
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best-response function of jurisdiction i is
gi (gj , gh) =
8
65
(3 + 2ǫi − ǫj − ǫh − gj − gh) (1.8)
which means that infrastructure investments at stage 2 are strategic substitutes.19 Taken to-
gether, from the reaction functions in Eqs. (1.6) and (1.8) we observe, that an increase in in-
frastructure investments in a rival jurisdiction is responded with a decrease in own investments
(dgi/dgj < 0) and a reduction in capital taxation (dti/dgj = (∂ti/∂gi) (dgi/dgj) + ∂ti/∂gj < 0),
while a reduction of a rival’s capital tax rate is responded directly with a reduction in tax rates,
too (dti/dtj < 0). Thus, jurisdictions use tax rates instead of infrastructure investments to react
to more aggressive capital attraction policies by their rivals.







(2ǫi − ǫj − ǫh) . (1.9)







(2ǫi − ǫj − ǫh) . (1.10)
Using this expression we can write gNi = 8/9t
N








Regarding the tax rates and infrastructure investments in the different jurisdictions we obtain
from Eqs. (1.9) and (1.10) that infrastructure investments and tax rates are higher in the more






j iff ǫi > ǫj). From the literature we know that in
the SPNE tax rates are inefficiently low yielding an underprovision of public goods. Furthermore,
when jurisdictions can choose their infrastructure investments freely, in the Nash equilibrium,
infrastructure investments are too high (Keen and Marchand, 1997). We state this as a first
result:
Lemma 1 Starting from a non-cooperative subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and holding in-
frastructure investments constant, a small rise in tax rates increases welfare in all jurisdictions.




= − 6581 < 0.
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Likewise, holding tax rates constant, a small reduction in infrastructure investments increases
welfare in all jurisdictions.
From Lemma 1 follows that tax rates and the provision of public goods are inefficiently
low and infrastructure investments are inefficiently high. This result is due to the prisoner’s
dilemma property of this type of games. While the coordination of tax rates and infrastructure
investments increases welfare in all jurisdictions, a deviation by a single jurisdiction from this
situation would allow it to realize even higher welfare gains. Therefore, in equilibrium, all
countries deviate and a Pareto inferior situation is attained.
1.2.2 Partial tax harmonization
Now, consider that a subgroup of jurisdictions, 1 and 2, form a coalition subgroup that can
credibly commit to a common tax rate. As we have seen before, without such a commitment
both jurisdictions would deviate from any commonly agreed tax rate. Furthermore, we assume
that such a commitment is not feasible for jurisdiction 3. This assumption is realistic, for
example, if we consider that jurisdictions 1 and 2 are EU member countries, for which different
mechanisms are available that could serve to guarantee a potential commitment, and jurisdiction
3 is a nonmember country. More precisely, following the literature, consider that jurisdictions
1 and 2 jointly maximizes the welfare of this group (i.e., W1 + W2) to choose a common tax
rate, tc, on which both jurisdictions agree publicly and to which they can credibly commit.
20
Jurisdiction 3, simultaneously, determines its tax rate t3.
The stage 3 equilibrium tax rates are obtained from solving maxtc W1 +W2 and maxt3 W3,
respectively, and are given by
tc = 1 +





− ǫ2 − 2ǫ3 + g1 + g2 − 2g3
12
. (1.12)
In stage 2, as in the non-cooperative benchmark case, the three jurisdictions choose their infras-































(ǫ2 − 2ǫ3) . (1.13)
20This assumption has been used, for example, by Burbidge et al. (1997), Konrad and Schjelderup (1999),
Fuest and Huber (2001), Conconi et al. (2008), Bucovetsky (2009), Kammas and Philippopouslos (2010), Eggert
and Itaya (2014) or Han et al. (2017).
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(ǫ2 − 2ǫ3) . (1.14)



































In stage 1, jurisdictions 1 and 2 decide to form a tax coalition with a common tax rate when
both jurisdictions obtain a higher welfare, i.e., when W Ti > W
N
i for i = 1, 2. The following
result states when this is the case.
Proposition 1 i) Partial tax harmonization yields an increase in tax rates and infrastructure






i , i = 1, 2) and takes place when the
jurisdictions in the tax coalition are not too different in their productivity levels (i.e., when ǫ2
is small). Welfare gains inside the coalition are larger for the more productive jurisdiction. ii)
The jurisdiction outside the tax coalition increases (decreases) its tax rate and infrastructure
investment when its productivity is low (high). Therefore, partial tax harmonization is easier to
achieve when the productivity level of the jurisdiction outside the tax coalition is low.
From Proposition 1 we observe that the formation of a tax coalition induces its members to
increase their (inefficiently low) capital rates to the common tax level. However, as tax rates
and infrastructure investments are strategic complements, they compensate less competition in
taxes with a more aggressive competition in infrastructure investments. Therefore, infrastructure
investments are even more inefficient than in the non-cooperative equilibrium. This result has
also been observed by other authors. If jurisdictions cooperate on one instrument they might end
up acting more aggressively on another that is a strategic complement (Keen and Marchand,
1997; Keen and Konrad, 2013; Han et al., 2017).
That partial tax harmonization can be beneficial under credible commitment has already
been shown by Konrad and Schjelderup (1999) and Fuest and Huber (2001) for symmetric
jurisdictions. From the above result we observe the importance of the symmetry assumption.
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Figure 1.4: Equilibria are: T (partial tax harmonization) and N (non-cooperation).
The jurisdictions that form part of the tax coalition increase their tax rates, where the increase
is superior for the less productive jurisdiction. Therefore, the more asymmetric the tax coalition
partners are, the larger are the costs from capital outflows for the less productive jurisdiction.
When the difference in productivity between jurisdictions becomes substantial, these costs exceed
the gains from reduced tax competition for the less productive jurisdiction such that the tax
coalition is not formed. Moreover, the convenience of forming a partial tax coalition between
jurisdictions 1 and 2 also depends on the reaction of the nonmember jurisdiction. The response
of jurisdiction 3 to the increase in tax levels depends on its productivity level. Thus, jurisdiction
3 mimics the behavior of the tax coalition and also increases its tax rate and infrastructure
investment when its productivity is low. Otherwise, when jurisdiction 3’s productivity is high, it
reacts more aggressively and decreases its tax rate meaning that it attracts more capital from the
tax coalition whose formation, therefore, becomes less beneficial. These results are represented in
Fig. 1.4 in the (ǫ2, ǫ3)-space, where we display the areas under which partial tax harmonization
(T) and non-cooperation (N) are the welfare maximization SPNE for the members of the tax
coalition.
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1.3 Partial tax harmonization with infrastructure coordination
1.3.1 Jurisdiction-specific investments
Now, consider that jurisdictions 1 and 2 form a coalition subgroup which chooses both, a common
capital tax rate tc and the level of infrastructure investments g1 and g2 that maximize the
joint welfare of this group. This kind of infrastructure coordination allows to internalize the
negative externalities of too fierce competition in infrastructure levels observed under both non-
cooperation and partial tax harmonization. Such an infrastructure coordination policy is pursued
by most of the centralized economies where infrastructure investments in the different regions
of the economy are centrally decided. But also in decentralized economies a substantial part of
infrastructure investments is decided by the central government. For example, in the US, the
federal government is responsible for about 25% of total spending on transportation and water
infrastructure where the decision in which state to invest is taken discretionary at the federal
level.22 The objective of this section is to study whether this kind of infrastructure coordination
facilitates the formation of a partial tax coalition.
The stage 3 equilibrium tax rates are the same as in the partial tax coordination case and,
thus, are given by Eqs. (1.12). In stage 2, jurisdictions 1 and 2 choose g1 and g2 to maximize
the joint welfare of the coalition. Simultaneously, jurisdiction 3 determines its own level of





















− 4 (ǫ2 − 2ǫ3)
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(ǫ2 − 2ǫ3) . (1.17)
A comparison of equilibrium infrastructure investments in (1.16) and tax rates in (1.17) with
the corresponding ones under non-coordination in (1.9) and (1.10), shows that the common
tax rate of the tax coalition is above the ones chosen in the non-cooperative case (tTIc > t
N
i ,
i = 1, 2). Moreover, the formation of the tax coalition means lower (higher) infrastructure
22See CBO (2015).
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investment in jurisdiction 2 when the productivity of the jurisdiction outside the coalition is low









iff ǫ3 ⋚ ǫ).24 Considering Lemma 1, this means that both kinds of inefficiency (too low
tax rates and too high infrastructure investments) are reduced inside the tax coalition when the
productivity of the jurisdiction outside the coalition is low. Regarding the jurisdiction outside
the tax coalition, we find that its behavior crucially depends on its productivity level. When
jurisdiction 3’s productivity is low it increases its capital tax rate and infrastructure investment.
By contrast, when jurisdiction 3’s productivity is high, it decreases both of them which, as we
have seen before, corresponds to a more aggressive reaction.
On the other hand, a juxtaposition of the coalition’s equilibrium capital tax rate in (1.17)
and that under partial tax harmonization in (1.14) reveals that the coalition sets a lower capital
tax when infrastructure investments are also coordinated by the coalition (tTIc < t
T
c ). Moreover,
the jurisdiction-specific investment levels chosen by the tax coalition are below those under the
partial tax harmonization agreement (gTIi < g
T
i , i = 1, 2). The response of jurisdiction 3 to
these reductions in tax rates and infrastructure investments is to rise both instruments. To
analyze which of these two forms of tax coalition will emerge in equilibrium, we compare the
corresponding social welfare levels of the coalition members. Using Eqs. (1.16) and (1.17), social




































In stage 1, jurisdictions 1 and 2 decide whether or not to cooperate in infrastructure investments.
Cooperation will take place when the social welfare of both jurisdictions is higher than in the
situation analyzed in the previous section, i.e., non-cooperation and partial tax harmonization,
respectively. The following proposition gives the main result of this section.
Proposition 2 Infrastructure coordination with jurisdiction-specific investments between asym-
metric jurisdictions that form a partial tax coalition facilitates (hinders) partial tax harmoniza-
tion when the productivity level of the jurisdiction outside the coalition is low (high).
24The details are provided in the Appendix.




c − 12ǫ2, gTI2 = 524 tTIc + 12ǫ2, and gTI3 = 23 tTI3 .
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Equilibria under jurisdiction-specific infrastructure cooperation
Figure 1.5: Equilibria are: TI, TI’ (partial tax harmonization and infrastructure coordina-
tion with jurisdiction-specific investments), T, T’ (partial tax harmonization), and N (non-
cooperation).
A first message from Proposition 2 is that infrastructure coordination allows partial tax
harmonization agreements between asymmetric jurisdictions to be reached when this is not
possible without the coordination of infrastructure investments. This is the case when the
productivity of the coalition non-member is low (see area TI’ in Fig. 1.5). The intuition for
this result is that infrastructure coordination allows to internalize the negative externality of
overinvestment due to infrastructure competition. As a consequence, the joint coordination of
tax rates and infrastructure investments avoids the more aggressive competition in infrastructure
investments that is observed in the previous case where only tax rates are coordinated, and allows
to obtain additional gains for both coalition members.
The second message that emerges from Proposition 2 is, however, that infrastructure coor-
dination does not necessarily facilitate partial tax harmonization (see area T’ in 1.5) or makes
jurisdiction 1 even worse off compared to partial tax harmonization (see area T in 1.5). This is
the case when the members of the tax coalition are rather different in their productivity levels
and when the productivity of the non-member is high. The idea underlying this result can be
explained as follows. When the productivity of the coalition non-member is high, as seen above,
it reacts more aggressively and responds to the capital tax increase of the tax coalition by re-
ducing its capital tax rate. The optimal response of the tax coalition is then to increase the
18
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infrastructure investment in the more productive jurisdiction and to decrease it in the less pro-
ductive jurisdiction. Accordingly, the difference in infrastructure standards inside the coalition is
enlarged such that capital shifts from the less to the more productive jurisdiction. Consequently,
it is not attractive for a low productivity jurisdiction to form a tax coalition with infrastructure
coordination and it prefers only to harmonize capital taxation.
1.3.2 Common investment level
Finally, consider that jurisdictions 1 and 2 form a coalition subgroup which chooses both a
common capital tax rate tc and a common level of infrastructure investments gc that maximize the
joint welfare of this group. This kind of infrastructure coordination has several advantages. First,
as mentioned by Dhillon et al. (1999), policy coordination might fail because of informational
asymmetries. Therefore, agreeing upon a common investment level is easier to enforce than
having different investment levels. Second, it allows to reduce productivity asymmetries between
potential tax coalition partners that are a major handicap for the formation of such a coalition.
One way to achieve the coordination of infrastructure investments can be the creation of a
common fund which prioritizes investments in those regions that are characterized by lower
infrastructure investments which allows to balance overall investment levels.
Such an infrastructure coordination policy is applied, for example, in the EU where struc-
tural funds are used to reduce asymmetries in infrastructure investments among EU members.
To gauge whether such an infrastructure coordination policy helps facilitating partial tax har-
monization, again, we compare social welfare levels of the tax coalition members under such an
agreement with those obtained under mere partial tax harmonization.
Next, we solve the stage 2 and stage 3 subgames. Regarding the stage 3 equilibrium tax
rates, notice, that they are the same as under partial tax coordination and, thus, are given by
Eqs. (1.12). The stage 2 equilibrium infrastructure investments are obtained from maximizing
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. (1.19)












(ǫ2 − 2ǫ3) . (1.20)
19
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
FISCAL HARMONIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION AND GROWING DEMAND OF MORE REGIONAL AUTONOMY 
Patricia Sanz Córdoba 
 
Chapter 1
Juxtaposing the equilibrium tax rate of the tax coalition in Eq. (1.20) and that of the former
case in Eq. (1.17) reveals that the tax coalition chooses the same tax rate under both kind of
infrastructure coordination (i.e., tTICc = t
TI
c ). In what concerns the equilibrium infrastructure
investments, from Eqs. (1.16) and (1.19) we observe, as expected, that the common investment
level is situated above (below) that of the less (more) productive member of the tax coalition
with jurisdiction-specific investments (i.e., gTI
1
< gTICc < g
TI
2
).26 The jurisdiction outside the
tax coalition chooses the same capital tax rate and infrastructure investment under both types









The resulting social welfare functions under partial tax harmonization with infrastructure



































In stage 1, jurisdictions 1 and 2 form a tax coalition when both of them obtain higher social
welfare than in the non-cooperation and partial tax harmonization cases (N and T , respectively).
The following result elucidates the circumstances under which each type of agreement is the
equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 3 Infrastructure coordination through the choice of a common investment between
asymmetric jurisdictions that form a partial tax coalition makes both members better off than
under non-cooperation. When the productivity level of the jurisdiction outside the coalition is
high, jurisdiction 2 prefers the mere harmonization of tax rates.
As observed in Proposition 1, a major handicap to the formation of a tax coalition is the
productivity asymmetry between its members (see also Keen and Konrad, 2013). Agreeing upon
a common investment level allows the tax coalition members reducing this asymmetry because,
as seen above, the more productive member reduces its infrastructure investment while the less
productive one increases it. This equalization of productivity levels reduces the capital flows
inside the tax coalition from the less productive to the more productive member which allows
26As tTICc = t
TI
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to achieve the harmonization of tax rates that would otherwise not be in the interest of both
members (see area TIC’ in 1.6). However, with a high productivity competitor outside the tax
coalition, the welfare cost in terms of total capital outflows imposed on the more productive
member makes him to prefer not to coordinate infrastructure investments (see area T in 1.6).
Equilibria under the choice of a common infrastructure cooperation
Figure 1.6: Equilibria are: TIC, TIC’ (partial tax harmonization and infrastructure coordination
through the choice of a common investment level), and T (partial tax harmonization).
As a major difference between infrastructure coordination through a common investment
level and with jurisdiction-specific investments we observe that while the former agreement
particularly benefits the less productive jurisdiction, the latter benefits the more productive one.
Regarding the overall capability of both infrastructure coordination agreements in facilitating
(partial) tax harmonization we obtain the following result.
Proposition 4 Infrastructure coordination through the choice of a common investment level
allows partial tax harmonization between asymmetric jurisdictions that cannot be achieved by
infrastructure coordination with jurisdiction-specific investments.
Proposition 4 is appreciated immediately by comparing areas TI’ and TIC’ in Figs. 1.5 and
1.6, respectively. As the coalition chooses the same common tax rate in both cases, the intuition
for this result lies in the difference between the infrastructure investments chosen under the two
agreements. The common investment agreement allows to reduce asymmetries between coalition
members more than the jurisdiction-specific investment. Thus, it enables the formation of a tax
21
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coalition for a larger range of productivity asymmetries between coalition members than under
infrastructure coordination with jurisdiction-specific investments.
1.4 Conclusions
Tax harmonization has become an important concern in most developed economies because
tax competition has constantly decreased capital tax rates over recent decades and has led to
a shift of the tax burden from capital towards labor. As the global harmonization of capital
taxation is unlikely to be achieved, the literature has focused on the conditions that allow tax
harmonization in a coalition of countries. In this chapter we analyze how such a partial tax
harmonization is influenced by a simultaneous coordination of infrastructure investments. Two
kinds of infrastructure coordination are considered: infrastructure coordination with jurisdiction-
specific investments and through the choice of a common investment level. We obtain that
infrastructure coordination can facilitate partial tax harmonization. This is the case when the
coalition partners are not too different in their productivity levels. Furthermore, we find that
infrastructure coordination with a common investment level enables partial tax harmonization
even when asymmetries between coalition members are substantial. This result indicates that
the EU structural funds policy can contribute to achieve tax harmonization as intended by the
EU.
The results imply that, as asymmetries between jurisdictions are an important handicap
to accomplish tax harmonization, a primary objective of policy makers that want to achieve
a voluntary harmonization of capital taxation should be to reduce these asymmetries. The
coordination of infrastructure investments can be an instrument to carry out this objective.
The analysis has shown that even a reduction of public infrastructure investments in some
jurisdictions can be welfare enhancing for all coalition members when this finally leads to an
harmonization of tax rates in the tax coalition.
As the analysis is based on a highly stylized model, some final comments regarding the
robustness of the results are indicated. First, we have considered a three-jurisdiction model.
However, our main results can be generalized straightforwardly to the case in which we have
more jurisdictions. Naturally, tax harmonization will be more difficult to achieve with more
jurisdictions inside the tax coalition. Similarly, it will also become more difficult to form a tax
coalition with more jurisdictions outside the tax coalition because, then, competition will be more
fierce. Our result that asymmetries between its members will further difficult the formation of the
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tax coalition and that infrastructure coordination can facilitate tax harmonization, however, will
prevail under these circumstances. Second, we have assumed that tax rates and infrastructure
investments are chosen sequentially. With the simultaneous choice of both instruments tax
harmonization in our model is still welfare enhancing but to a less extent.28 Third, our focus is
on voluntary tax harmonization in a subgroup of countries. If countries pursue other objectives,
the equalization of infrastructure investments might not be a desirable policy. Fourth, we have
not explicitly allowed for side-payments between jurisdictions. From the results in Section 1.3.1 it
is immediate that in such a case the optimal solution consists in combining jurisdiction-specific
investments with side-payments to the less productive jurisdiction. However, the negotiation
of these payments among a larger group of countries might be difficult to achieve in practice.
Finally, it should be noticed that EU structural funds only affect hard infrastructure investments
(roads, bridges, tunnels, water supply, sewers, electrical grids, telecommunications, ...) while
differences in productivity levels also and perhaps even more importantly stem from differences in
soft infrastructure that refer to standards, education systems, health systems, regulations, or law.
Therefore, asymmetries in soft investments also present a handicap for tax harmonization and
their reduction should be in the focus of a policy that aims to facilitate capital tax harmonization.
Of course, such a ‘total infrastructure coordination’ is more difficult to realize or might even not
be desirable for other reasons which also explains why in practice the partial harmonization of
tax rates is so difficult to achieve.
The analysis also opens up interesting lines for further research. Thus, it could be com-
plemented by considering other forms of public tax decision making. For example, as in Borck
(2003) the choice of the tax structure could be considered in a majority voting model in which
jurisdictions compete in tax rates. Finally, our analysis is based on a horizontal coordination
of tax rates and infrastructure levels. As tax decisions are taken both at the state level and at
regional and local levels, it would be interesting to analyze how the interplay of horizontal and
vertical coordination of tax rates and infrastructure levels would affect our results.
28This result is in line with Han et al. (2017) who find that when decisions are taken simultaneously (global)
tax harmonization is less beneficial or even welfare reducing. The detailed results for the case of simultaneous
tax rate and infrastructure investment choice within our model can be obtained upon request from the authors.
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which proves that a joint tax increase by all jurisdictions increases welfare compared to the non-
cooperation case (N). As the provision of public goods equals tax revenues, tiki and ki does not
change when all jurisdictions increase tax rates by the same amount, it follows immediately that
public goods provision is too low. Finally, consider a reduction of infrastructure investments of



































which proves the last statement.
Proof of Proposition 1. i) The first statement follows from a comparison of Eqs. (1.10) and
(1.14), and (1.9) and (1.13), respectively, which yields









ǫ3 > 0, t
T




































for ∀ (ǫ2, ǫ3) ∈ R. From Eqs. (1.11) and (1.15) we have
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> 0 for ∀(ǫ2, ǫ3) ∈ R. Jurisdiction 2 is always better off under partial tax harmonization.
Regarding jurisdiction 1, from Eqs. (1.11) and (1.15) we have
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for ∀(ǫ2, ǫ3) ∈ R. Thus, the welfare gains from partial tax harmonization are larger for jurisdic-
tion 2. ii) The second statement follows from a comparison of Eqs. (1.10) and (1.14), and (1.9)









































Proof of the results in Section 1.3.1. From Eqs. (1.10) and (1.17), we observe that
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Finally, a comparison of Eqs. (1.14) and (1.17) reveals that
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for ∀(ǫ2, ǫ3) ∈ R.
Proof of Proposition 2. First, consider jurisdiction 2. We have
∆W TI−T
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for ∀(ǫ2, ǫ3) ∈ R. Jurisdiction 2 is always better off under partial tax harmonization with
jurisdiction-specific investments (TI) than under partial tax harmonization (T ) (and under
non-cooperation (N), as already shown in the proof of Proposition 1).
Second, for jurisdiction 1 we have
∆W TI−T
1
(ǫ2, ǫ3) ≡ W TI1 (ǫ2, ǫ3)−W T1 (ǫ2, ǫ3)
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, 0) = −0.0463 < 0 and ∂∆W T−N
1
/∂ǫ2 =
0.1346ǫ3 − 0.0687ǫ2 − 0.3318 < 0 for ∀(ǫ2, ǫ3)ǫR. Thus, there is a unique function fTI−N(ǫ2) =
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− 7712640ǫ2 + 696800 defined by ∆W TI−N1 (ǫ2, ǫ3) = 0
which separates R in two areas with ∆W TI−N
1




< 0 for ǫ2 > fTI−N(ǫ2).
Finally, notice that functions fT−N(ǫ2), fTI−N(ǫ2) and fTI−T (ǫ2) have a single intersection
point in R at (ǫ2, ǫ3) = (0.1711, 1.0892) which separates R in five areas (displayed in Fig. 5):
1. Area TI: (ǫ2 < fTI−T (ǫ2) and ǫ2 < fT−N(ǫ2)) where W
TI
i (ǫ2, ǫ3) > W
N
i (ǫ2, ǫ3) and
W TIi (ǫ2, ǫ3) > W
T
i (ǫ2, ǫ3), i = 1, 2, such that the equilibrium outcome is TI which is
preferred by all jurisdictions.
2. Area TI ′: (fT−N(ǫ2) < ǫ2 < fTI−N(ǫ2)) whereW
TI
i (ǫ2, ǫ3) > W
N
i (ǫ2, ǫ3) andW
TI
i (ǫ2, ǫ3) >
W Ti (ǫ2, ǫ3), i = 1, 2, such that the equilibrium outcome is also TI which is preferred by
all jurisdictions.
3. Area T : (fTI−T (ǫ2) < ǫ2 < fTI−N(ǫ2)) where W
T
1









(ǫ2, ǫ3) and W
T
i (ǫ2, ǫ3) > W
N
i (ǫ2, ǫ3), i = 1, 2. The equilibrium outcome is T as
jurisdiction 1 does not agree to coordinate infrastructure investments which is the preferred
outcome for jurisdiction 2.
4. Area T ′: (fTI−N(ǫ2) < ǫ2 < fT−N(ǫ2)) where W
T
1









(ǫ2, ǫ3) and W
T
i (ǫ2, ǫ3) > W
N
i (ǫ2, ǫ3), i = 1, 2. Again, the equilibrium outcome is
T as jurisdiction 1 does not agree to coordinate infrastructure investments which is the
preferred outcome for jurisdiction 2.
5. AreaN : (ǫ2 > fT−N(ǫ2) and ǫ2 > fTI−N(ǫ2)) whereW
N
1









(ǫ2, ǫ3). The equilibrium outcome is N as jurisdiction 1 loses from both partial tax
harmonization (T ) and partial tax harmonization with infrastructure coordination where
investments are jurisdiction-specific (TI).
Proof of Proposition 3. First, consider jurisdiction 1. From Eqs. (1.11), (1.15) and
(1.21) we have that jurisdiction 1 is always better off under partial tax harmonization with
infrastructure coordination through the choice of a common investment level (TIC) than under
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non-cooperation (N) and partial tax harmonization (T ):
∆W TIC−N
1























(ǫ2, ǫ3) ≡ W TIC1 −W T1 =
261 092
7049 025


















for ∀(ǫ2, ǫ3) ∈ R. Second, consider jurisdiction 2. From Eqs. (1.11) and (1.21) we have
that jurisdiction 2 is always better off under partial tax harmonization with infrastructure co-

























for ∀(ǫ2, ǫ3) ∈ R. Thus, as both jurisdictions are better off under TIC than under N , non-
cooperation (N) is not an equilibrium. Furthermore, from Eqs. (1.15) and (1.21) we have
∆W TIC−T
2
(ǫ2, ǫ3) ≡ W TIC2 −W T2 =
261 092
7049 025
























, 0) = −0.0175 < 0 and ∂∆W TIC−T
2
/∂ǫ2 =








1348 521ǫ2 − 290 64580 336 ǫ2 defined by ∆W
TIC−T
2
(ǫ2, ǫ3) = 0 which separates R in
two areas with ∆W TIC−T
2
(ǫ2, ǫ3) > 0 for ǫ2 < fTIC−T (ǫ2) and ∆W
TIC−T
2
(ǫ2, ǫ3) < 0 for ǫ2 >
fTIC−T (ǫ2).
Finally, notice that functions fT−N(ǫ2) and fTIC−T (ǫ2) separate R in three areas (displayed
in Fig. 6):
1. Area TIC: (ǫ2 < fTIC−T (ǫ2) and ǫ2 < fT−N(ǫ2)) where W
TIC
i (ǫ2, ǫ3) > W
T
i (ǫ2, ǫ3) >
WNi (ǫ2, ǫ3), i = 1, 2 such that the equilibrium outcome is TIC which is preferred by all
jurisdictions to T and N .
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2. Area TIC ′: ( ǫ2 > fT−N(ǫ2)) where W
TIC
1
(ǫ2, ǫ3) > W
N
1






(ǫ2, ǫ3) > W
N
2
(ǫ2, ǫ3). The equilibrium outcome is TIC as both jurisdictions are
better off under this agreement than under non-cooperation which is the equilibrium out-
come in the benchmark (see Proposition 1).
3. Area T : (fTIC−T (ǫ2) < ǫ2 < fT−N(ǫ2)) where W
T
i (ǫ2, ǫ3) > W
N
i (ǫ2, ǫ3), i = 1, 2, W
TIC
1
(ǫ2, ǫ3) > W
T
1
(ǫ2, ǫ3), and W
T
2
(ǫ2, ǫ3) > W
TIC
2
(ǫ2, ǫ3). The equilibrium outcome is T as
jurisdiction 2 does not agree to coordinate infrastructure investments which is the preferred
outcome for jurisdiction 1.
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i , and from the discussion in Section 1.2.1 we observe that
sufficient conditions for positive equilibrium values in the non-cooperative case are that the tax














Regarding the equilibrium values under partial tax harmonization, from Proposition 1 we know






















sufficient conditions for positive equilibrium values are that tT
3
> 0 and kT
1
> 0












Now, consider partial tax harmonization with infrastructure coordination and jurisdiction-specific
investments. The discussion in Section 1.3.1 has shown that tTIc > t
N



















sufficient conditions for positive equilibrium values are gTI
1
> 0 and kTI
1
















Finally, consider partial tax harmonization with infrastructure coordination through the choice



















A comparison of Eqs. (1.22)-(1.25) yields, that the binding restrictions that guarantee positive
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Simultaneous choice of instruments
Non-cooperative equilibrium




















































ti − gi = 0.












and the equilibrium welfare levels are:
WN,Si (ti, gi) =
1
24











W1 (tc, g1) +W2 (tc, g2) , max
g1
W1 (tc, g1) , max
g2
W2 (tc, g2) , max
t3,g3
W3 (t3, g3) .







(ǫ2 − 2ǫ3 + g1 + g2 − 2g3 + 2t3 − 5tc + 4) = 0,
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(ǫ2 − 2ǫ3 + g1 + g2 + 7g3 − t3 − 2tc − 2) = 0.
The equilibrium values are:












































































(4− ǫ2 + 2ǫ3)2 .
New relevant region









implies that all values are positive when
tN,S
1
> 0 and tN,S
3
> 0 which is guaranteed by 1
2









, sufficient conditions for positive equilibrium values under partial
tax harmonization are tT,S
3
> 0 and gT,S
1
> 0 which is guaranteed by −2 + 1
2
ǫ2 < ǫ3 < 2 − 12ǫ2.
The binding conditions are 1
2
ǫ2 − 1 < ǫ3 < 2− ǫ2.
Welfare comparisons
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ǫ2 (4 + ǫ2 − 2ǫ3) > 0.
Thus, the coalition is formed whenever it is beneficial for jurisdiction 1. The conditions under
which this is the case are displayed in the following Figure 1.7. It can be observed by com-
paring the new area with that of Fig. 1.4, that under simultaneous choice of both instruments
harmonization is still welfare enhancing but to a less extent.
Equilibria under the simultaneous choice of both instruments
Figure 1.7: Equilibria are: T,S (partial tax harmonization with the simultaneous choice of both
instruments), T (partial tax harmonization with the sequential choice of both instruments), and
N (non-cooperation).
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STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TAX
COMPETITION: FISCAL (DE)CENTRALIZATION VERSUS PARTIAL
TAX HARMONIZATION
Overview. This chapter analyzes a country’s optimal fiscal strategy
among centralization, decentralization, and partial tax harmonization.
Countries are asymmetric in productivity levels and characterized by multi-
level government such that there is both horizontal and vertical tax compe-
tition. The main result from the analysis is that partial tax harmonization
is more difficult to achieve in fiscally decentralized economies with high
levels of productivity and low labor taxation. This result is confirmed
by recent data from the OECD and explains the observed difficulties in
achieving capital tax harmonization in the European Union.
Keywords: Centralization; Decentralization; Fiscal Competition; Partial
Tax Harmonization.
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Tax competition is a major concern in economic policy debates as increasing international capital
mobility has led to a race to the bottom in capital taxation. This phenomenon has led to
inefficiently low capital taxation and to a shift of the tax burden from capital towards labor
resulting in increased inequality in most developed countries (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986;
Wilson, 1986; Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991; Piketty, 2014). A natural response to excessive
(horizontal) tax competition is the coordination of capital tax rates (Bucovetsky, 1991; Kanbur
and Keen, 1993; Fuest and Huber, 2001; Devereux and Fuest, 2010; Keen and Konrad, 2013).
However, as the global coordination of tax rates is difficult to achieve, the economic literature
has focused on the coordination of tax rates among a group of countries and has shown that
such a partial tax harmonization is welfare enhancing under certain conditions (Burbidge et al.,
1997; Konrad and Schjelderup, 1999; Beaudry et al., 2000; Sørensen, 2004; Brøchner et al., 2007;
Conconi et al., 2008; Bucovetsky, 2009; Bettendorf et al., 2010; Vrijburg and de Mooij, 2010;
Eichner and Pething, 2013).
While the aforementioned literature assumes that partial tax harmonization takes place
among centralized countries, in this chapter, we consider tax harmonization as a strategic re-
sponse to international tax competition in a more general setting where countries can also be
decentralized economies. This is particularly relevant because an increasing tendency towards
more fiscal decentralization has been observed over the last decades in most developed economies
as more tax autonomy has been delegated from the central to regional and local governments
(Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005). Moreover, Figure 2.1 indicates this is a tendency which does
not depend on a country’s initial degree of capital tax decentralization. At the same time, we
observe efforts for the partial coordination of tax rates among a group of countries with large
differences in their degree of fiscal decentralization. For example, the European Union (EU)
whose member countries show considerable differences in their degree of fiscal decentralization
has promoted several directives and proposals in order to achieve a certain degree of capital
tax harmonization. The Neumark Report in 1962 and the Tempel Report in 1970 are the first
that recommend corporate tax harmonization of tax bases and tax rates in the EU. The Code
of Conduct approved in 1997 recommends to prevent the distortion and the erosion of tax bases
in business taxation within the European Community. In 2011, the European Commission pro-
posed a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) which, however, proved to be too
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Capital tax decentralization by quartiles (period 1995 to 2014)
Figure 2.1: Countries are classified into quartiles by degree of capital tax decentralization. Quar-
tile 1 includes Austria, Estonia, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden, Turkey,
and United Kingdom. Quartile 2 encompasses Chile, Czech Republic, Finland, Israel, Nether-
lands and Norway are situated. Quartile 3 comprises Belgium, Denmark, France, Japan, Korea,
Latvia, Switzerland are encompassed. Quartile 4 involves Australia, Canada, Germany, New
Zealand, Slovenia, Spain, and United States. Measurement: Share of local and regional capital
tax revenues over total capital tax revenues. Source: Own calculation based on OECD (2017).
ambitious for several member states. In 2016, the European Commission proposed to re-launch
the CCCTB by making it mandatory only for the largest companies in the EU.1
In this context, we build on the models of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson (1986) and
Keen and Kotsogiannis (2003) allowing a subset of centralized jurisdictions to form a tax coalition
à la Konrad and Schelderup (1999). We consider three countries differing in their productivity
levels with two jurisdictions in each. Tax rates on a common tax base are chosen by both the
central and local governments. Thus, we allow for horizontal tax competition (between countries
and among jurisdictions) and vertical tax competition (between central and local governments).
The focus is on the optimal fiscal strategy of a country in the context of international (and
national) tax competition. Three strategies are considered: i) fiscal centralization under which
1See Dankó (2012) and European Commission (2017) for more details on the EU directives and proposals for
the coordination of taxes.
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the central government decides all tax rates in the country; ii) fiscal decentralization under
which central and local governments choose independently their capital tax rates; and iii) partial
harmonization under which two countries form a tax union that commonly determines a unique
tax rate for all jurisdictions. The timing of the game is as follows. In stage 1, country 1 chooses
one of the three aforementioned strategies. In stage 2, central (and local) governments decide
simultaneously their tax rates.
The main insight that can be obtained from our analysis is that fiscal decentralization is
a handicap in achieving partial harmonization of capital taxation. Thus, it is shown that tax
harmonization is more difficult to obtain for high productivity countries that are fiscally decen-
tralized. The intuition for this result is that tax competition is less fierce in this case because,
due to vertical tax competition, the consolidated tax rate is higher in a fiscally decentralized
country than in a centralized economy. As tax rates are strategic complements, other countries
also increment capital taxation. As it turns out, the raise in international capital taxation is the
more pronounced the larger is the productivity difference between the decentralized economy
and the other countries. Therefore, a possible gain from the formation of a tax union is reduced
when a potential member of the tax union is a decentralized high productivity economy. Our
result indicates that the recent tendency towards more fiscal decentralization in EU member
countries has rendered the achievement of capital tax harmonization in the EU more difficult.
Our analysis is related to three strands of the literature. First, it builds on the tax com-
petition literature with asymmetric jurisdictions or countries. As emphasized by Keen and
Konrad (2013), allowing for asymmetries comes at the price of imposing restrictions on the
functional forms of production and utility functions to obtain analytically tractable models (see
e.g., Wildasin, 1991; Bucovetsky, 2009; Hindriks et al., 2008; Kempf and Rota-Graziosi, 2010).
From this literature several insights are obtained. Thus, it has been shown that tax rates are
higher with a stronger taste for public goods and in countries that are richer in capital, more
productive, or more populated (see Keen and Konrad, 2013). As in Hindriks et al. (2008) in this
chapter we focus on differences in productivity levels to allow for asymmetries between countries.
The second strand of the literature studies partial tax harmonization. As the harmonization
of tax rates between all countries, despite its benefits, is difficult to achieve, the recent literature
has focused on the conditions under which the formation of a tax coalition between a subset of
jurisdictions is possible. Konrad and Schelderup (1999) and Sanz-Córdoba and Theilen (2017)
find that such a partial tax harmonization can be welfare-enhancing for its members when tax
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rates are strategic complements and when the coalition members are not too different. Brøchner
et al. (2007) use a general equilibrium model to estimate empirically the effect of partial tax
harmonization in the EU on its member countries. They find that this, despite its overall
moderate welfare gains, would require the introduction of a compensation mechanism because
some EU members states would lose from tax harmonization. The challenge for the EU is
therefore either to agree upon such compensation mechanisms or to reduce the asymmetries
between countries to render tax harmonization beneficial for all of its members.
Thirdly, the chapter is related to the literature on the effects of vertical tax competition in
decentralized economies. That fiscal decentralization can be efficient is a classical result that
has been shown, e.g., by Tiebout (1956), Oates (1972) and Brennan and Buchanan (1980).
The effects of vertical tax competition in a multilevel government federation has been analyzed
by Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002, 2003). They elucidate that while horizontal tax competition
yields inefficiently low tax rates, vertical tax competition, in contrast, leads to inefficiently
high tax rates. Furthermore, it is shown that, generally, the vertical externality dominates the
horizontal tax competition such that tax rates are above the social optimum and tax revenues
are unambiguously increased by a small cut in either federal or central government’s tax rates.
This result is empirically confirmed by Brühart and Jametti (2006) who study horizontal and
vertical externalities of capital taxation with panel data for Swiss cantons and municipalities.
Finally, most related to this chapter, Haufler and Lülfesmann (2015) analyze a two-tier
structure of capital taxation where asymmetric jurisdictions harmonize their federal capital tax
rate in the first stage, and then non-cooperatively set local tax rates in the second stage. They
show that this mechanism allows to reduce inefficiently high tax competition at the horizontal
level. Moreover, it distributes the gains across asymmetric jurisdictions in a way that represents
a Pareto improvement over a one-tier system in which tax rates are completely determined at
the local level. The main difference between their and our model is that Haufler and Lülfesmann
(2015) assume from the beginning that countries are decentralized and that tax rates can be
harmonized while our focus is on the condition that render partial tax harmonization and fiscal
decentralization an equilibrium outcome.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 sets up the model. Section 2.3
studies tax competition between centralized economies. Section 2.4 elucidates the advantages
of unilateral fiscal decentralization. Section 2.5 analyzes partial tax harmonization and indi-
cates under which circumstances centralization, decentralization and tax harmonization are the
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optimal fiscal strategy for a given country. Section 2.6 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2.2 The model
Consider a tax competition model in the spirit of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson
(1986) with three countries, indexed by i = 1, 2, 3, each of which contains N = 2 jurisdictions
indexed r = 1, 2. The framework is modified by allowing for asymmetries in productivity between
countries and, as in Konrad and Schjelderup (1999), we allow a subset of countries to form a tax
coalition. Each jurisdiction is inhabited by an identical number of immobile residents with mass
one who each supply one unit of labor. Jurisdictions compete by choosing a unit per capital tax
rate tir to attract mobile capital from other jurisdictions of their own country and from the rest
of the world. The central government in country i levies a unit tax on capital at the rate Ti
which is common to all jurisdictions. We refer to τir ≡ Ti + tir as the consolidated capital tax
rate in jurisdiction ir. Output is produced using capital and labor and the production function
is written in intensive form, fi(ki), with the standard assumptions of f
′
i > 0, f
′′
i < 0, where
kir denotes the capital per worker employed in jurisdiction r in country i. The total amount of
capital is fixed and normalized to 1. Capital is perfectly mobile between jurisdictions such that
the net return to capital, ρ, is determined by the following arbitrage condition
ρ = f ′ir (kir)− τir for i = 1, 2, 3; r = 1, 2. (2.1)
Following the literature, we assume the following linear quadratic production function
fir (kir) = aikir −
b
2
k2ir, i = 1, 2, 3; r = 1, 2, (2.2)
where ai > 0 and sufficiently large (Hindriks et al., 2008; Bucovetsky, 2009; Hauptmeier, et al.,
2012; Eichner and Pething, 2013). Rents or labor income in jurisdiction ir are denoted by




and are taxed at the rate x by local governments of the jurisdictions and at the rate X by the
central government of the respective countries. As in Keen and Kotsogiannis (2003), we take
these tax rates as given and common across jurisdictions and countries. The combined tax rate
on labor is denoted by χ ≡ X + x.
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where γi = b+ 4ai − 2aj − 2ah.
There are no intergovernmental transfers, neither vertically between the central government
and the jurisdictions of a country nor horizontally across countries or the jurisdictions of the
same country.2 Tax receipts of jurisdictions and central governments are given by
Rir = tirkir + xΠir and Ri =
N∑
i=1
(Tikir +XΠir) , (2.5)
respectively. As commonly assumed in the literature (e.g. Brennan and Buchanan, 1977; Keen
and Kotsogiannis, 2003; Agrawal, 2016), policymakers, i.e., central governments and jurisdic-
tions, are revenue-maximizing Leviathans that choose capital tax rates Ti and tir, respectively,
to maximize their tax revenues.3 Thus, countries and jurisdictions compete both horizontally
and vertically to attract international mobile capital to their location. We refer to τir = Ti +tir
as the consolidated capital tax rate in jurisdiction ir.
We assume that countries 1 and 2 are able to credibly commit to a common tax rate and,
therefore, to form a tax coalition.4 A tax union is formed whenever it is beneficial for both
partners. We assume that such a commitment is not possible for country 3.5 To keep the model
2As shown by Egger et al. (2010), intergovernmental transfers are an effective instrument to alleviate vertical
tax competition.
3An alternative would be assuming that policy makers maximize the utility of a representative consumer
with preferences
Uir = Cir + Γ(Gir , Gi),
where Cir defines his consumption, and Gir and Gi are the level public goods provided by jurisdiction ir and
the central government i, respectively. Considering that a proportion of government receipts is spent on public
goods, such that Gir = λRir and Gi = λRi (0 < λ < 1), and a consumer’s budget constraint Cir = e+(1−χ)Πir,
where e denotes the consumer’s fixed endowment, the indirect utility can be written
Uir = e+ (1− χ)Πir + Γ(λRir , λRi).
However, if locally and centrally provided goods are perfect (or close) substitutes and with λ large enough, more
consolidated tax revenues would imply an increase in consumer utility as equilibrium tax rates and public goods
provision under tax competition are inefficiently low (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986; Wilson, 1986; Bucovetsky
and Wilson, 1991). Therefore, in this case maximizing tax revenues is equivalent to maximizing consumer welfare.
4This is a common assumption in the literature (Burbidge et al., 1997; Konrad and Schjelderup, 1999; Fuest
and Huber, 2001; Conconi et al., 2008).
5Notice that the grand coalition cannot be sustained because unilateral deviation from the grand coalition
capital tax equilibrium is welfare enhancing. This is because of the Prisoner’s dilemma property of this game.
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tractable we also assume that countries 2 and 3 have identical productivity levels (a2 = a3 = a)
while country 1’s productivity level is a1 = a + ǫ such that it can be either more (ǫ > 0) or less
productive (ǫ < 0) than countries 2 and 3. Furthermore, to guarantee nonnegative equilibrium















The timing of the game is as follows. First, in stage 1, country 1 decide whether to coordinate
capital taxes with country 2. Once a decision is taken, central governments (in centralized
economies) and both central and local governments (if country 1 is a decentralized economy)
decide simultaneously their capital tax rates in stage 2. All decisions at each stage are taken
simultaneously by all jurisdictions (and the tax coalition).
2.3 Centralized economies
Consider first the case in which all economies are centralized such that the central government in
each country decides all tax rates which, in this case, is equivalent to choosing the consolidated




r=1Rir, i.e., after making use of Eqs. (2.5), by solving
max
τi1,τi2








, i = 1, 2, 3. (2.6)
From the first-order conditions we obtain the following reaction functions
τir =
3− 2χ
30− 13χ (γi + τjr + τjs + τhr + τhs) +
6− 5χ
30− 13χτis (2.7)
where the condition ∂τir/∂τjr < 1 guarantees the stability of the equilibrium. We observe that
a reduction of a rival’s capital tax rate is responded directly with a reduction in tax rates such
that tax rates of different jurisdictions are strategic complements. From Eq. (2.7) the Nash-





(3− 2χ) 5b+ 8ǫ− 2bχ







(3− 2χ) 5b− 4ǫ− 2bχ
5− 2χ (2.8)
and the equilibrium total tax receipts in country i are
The existence of a commitment device is therefore essential to avoid deviation by tax coalition members.
6The details are in the Appendix.
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From Eq. (2.8) we find that equilibrium tax rates are larger in more productive countries
(τC
1r R τCir iff ǫ R 0, i = 2, 3) and decrease with labor taxation (∂τCir /∂χ < 0).7 As can be
seen from Eq. (2.6), this is because the marginal returns from labor taxation (i.e., labor income
which is b [k2i1 + k
2
i2] /2) decreases with capital taxation as ∂kir/∂τir < 0.
From the literature is well-known that the Nash equilibrium outcome is Pareto inefficient
and that all countries would benefit from a small uniform increase in capital tax rates. This
is due to the prisoner’s dilemma property of this type of games. Thus, a deviation by a single
country from the Pareto efficient equilibrium would allow it to realize higher welfare gains. In
equilibrium, all countries deviate by reducing their tax rates to attract foreign capital and a
Pareto inferior situation is attained. We summarize this as
Lemma 1 Starting from the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, a small increase in capital tax-
ation in all countries increases their consolidated tax revenue.
2.4 Fiscal decentralization
Now, consider that country 1 is a decentralized economy. Then, the local government in juris-
diction 1r chooses the tax rate t1r to maximize its tax receipts R1r, while the central government
chooses T1 to maximize tax revenues R1. Countries 2 and 3, as centralized economies, choose
the consolidated tax rates for both of their jurisdictions τ21 and τ22, and τ31 and τ32 to maximize


























= −τCir 4(3−2χ)(5−2χ) − 112 (3− 2χ) 2b(5−2χ) < 0, i = 1, 2, 3; r = 1, 2.
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, i = 2, 3. (2.12)





(27− 10χ) 5b+ 8ǫ− 2bχ




(3− 2χ) 37b− 20ǫ− 10bχ
33− 10χ , i = 2, 3; r = 1, 2. (2.14)

















, i = 2, 3. (2.15)
A comparison of Eqs. (2.8) and (2.13) shows that decentralization yields an increase in the
consolidated tax rate in country 1. As pointed out by Keen and Kotsogiannis (2003), this
stems from the common pool nature of the tax base and it is similar in nature to the double-
marginalization problem in a vertically disintegrated industry (Spengler, 1950). An increase
in capital taxation at the local or the central level reduces capital investments in that country.
Under decentralization, local and central governments ignore the negative externality that a raise
in own tax rates has on other governments’ tax revenues such that they choose inefficiently high
tax rates. As tax rates are strategic complements, countries 2 and 3 will react to the increase
in capital taxation in country 1 with a raise of their tax rates. From the results in Lemma 1
follows that this simultaneous increase in all countries’ capital tax rates is beneficial for all of
them. Therefore, in case of country 1, we have that decentralization has two opposed effects.
One the one hand, it reduces the consolidated tax revenues because it yields a negative vertical
externality as it causes an inefficient increase in tax rates. On the other hand, decentralization
works as a credible commitment to increase tax rates which causes an increase of tax rates
in other countries. This efficient increase in tax rates allows to reduce mutually damaging
horizontal tax competition among countries and has a positive horizontal externality on country
1’s consolidated tax revenue. We summarize these considerations as follows
8The detailed derivation of the results is in the Appendix.
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Lemma 2 Fiscal decentralization in a country yields an increase in its consolidated capital
tax rate and a capital outflow that is increasing in the combined tax rate on labor χ. The
negative externality of increased vertical tax competition in the decentralized economy is partially
compensated by a mitigation of horizontal tax competition among countries.
From Lemma 2 we observe that decentralization has two opposed effects on country 1’s con-
solidated tax revenue. The following result states under which conditions fiscal decentralization
allows a country to increase its total tax revenues.
Proposition 1 Unilateral fiscal decentralization increases a country’s consolidated tax revenue
when the combined tax rate on labor is low (χ < 1
2
) and decreases it when the combined tax rate
on labor is high (χ > 1
2
). The consolidated tax revenue in third countries increases.
The intuition of this result can be obtained from Lemmas 1 and 2. As mentioned before,
on the one hand, decentralization causes an inefficient increase in tax rates in country 1. On
the other hand, decentralization allows to reduce the inefficiency of too low tax rates at the
international level as it causes countries 2 and 3 to raise their tax rates. This lessens the negative
impact of decentralization on capital investments in country 1. From Lemma 2 we observe that
this mitigating effect is smaller when labour taxation is high because, then, countries 2 and 3
will not raise their tax rates to the same extent as with low levels of labor taxation. Thus, the
efficiency gain of having less damaging horizontal tax competition decreases with the combined
tax rate on labor and dominates (is dominated by) the efficiency cost of vertical tax competition
under a low (high) regime of labor taxation.
2.5 Partial tax harmonization
Finally, consider that a subgroup of countries, i.e., countries 1 and 2, form a coalition subgroup,
and publicly and credibly commit to a common capital tax rate.9 As we have seen before,
without such a commitment both countries would deviate from any commonly agreed tax rate.
Furthermore, we assume that such a commitment is not possible for country 3. This assumption
is realistic if we consider that countries 1 and 2 are already members of a trade or economic
coalition as the EU, for example. In such a case different mechanisms could be used to guarantee
9This assumption has been used by Burbidge et al. (1997), Konrad and Schelderup (1999), Fuest and Huber
(2001), Conconi et al. (2008), Bucovetsky (2009), Kammas et al. (2010), Egger et al. (2014), or Han et al.
(2017).
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a commitment. In line with the literature, we consider that the tax coalition maximizes the joint
total revenues of central and local governments of both countries (i.e., TR1 + TR2) to choose
a common combined capital tax rate, τc. Country 3, simultaneously, chooses τ31 and τ32 to
maximize its total tax revenue (TR3). The optimal tax rates are obtained by solving
max
τc


























The Nash-equilibrium tax rates under partial tax harmonization, τHc and τ
H









(3− 2χ) 4b− 2ǫ− bχ
3− χ , r = 1, 2. (2.18)





























From a comparison of Eqs. (2.8) and (2.18) we find that the tax coalition chooses a common









tax rates are strategic complements, the country outside the tax coalition also increases its tax
rate (τH
3r − τC3r > 0) but to a lower proportion (i.e., τHc > τH3r). As a consequence, partial tax
harmonization yields an capital outflow from the members of the tax coalition to country 3.
Finally, as the increase in tax rates inside the tax coalition is superior in the less productive
country, the capital outflow is larger there. We resume these results in the next Lemma.
Lemma 3 Partial tax harmonization yields an increase in the consolidated capital tax rate inside
the tax coalition and a capital outflow towards the non-member country that also increases its
capital tax rate but to a lower extent.
In stage 1, countries 1 and 2 decide to form a tax coalition with a common combined capital
tax when both countries obtain higher total tax receipts, i.e., when TRHi > TR
C
i , for i = 1, 2.
The following result states when this is the case.
10The detailed derivation of the results is in the Appendix.
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Proposition 2 Starting from a non-cooperative equilibrium with centralized economies, partial
tax harmonization increases the consolidated tax revenues of the tax coalition members when
their productivity levels are not too different. The gain in tax receipts is larger for the more
productive country.
From Lemma 3 we observe that the formation of the tax coalition induces its members to
increase capital tax rates to the common tax level. The resulting capital outflow is mitigated
since the country outside the tax coalition also rises its tax rates such that international tax com-
petition is less fierce. Therefore the formation of the tax coalition allows its members to increase
their tax revenues. However, when the members of the tax coalition differ in their productivity,
agreeing upon a common tax rate means that the less productive member suffers larger capital
outflows. Consequently, partial tax harmonization is not in the interest of the less productive
member when these productivity differences are large. That partial tax harmonization under
credible commitment can be an equilibrium outcome has also been observed by Konrad and
Schelderup (1999) and Fuest and Huber (2001) for the case of symmetric economies. Thus,
Proposition 2 also highlights the importance of the symmetry assumption in order to obtain
these results.
Now, consider the situation in which country 1 is a decentralized economy. Then, a tax
coalition with a common combined capital tax between countries 1 an 2 is formed when TRHi >
TRDi , for i = 1, 2. The following result states when this is the case.
Proposition 3 Starting from non-cooperative equilibrium in which country 1 is decentralized,
partial tax harmonization increases the consolidated tax revenues of the tax coalition members
when their productivity levels are not too different. The gain in tax receipts is larger for the more
productive country.
The intuition behind this result is similar to the one of Proposition 2. Interestingly, however,
if country 1 is a high productivity economy tax harmonization is less likely to occur when
country 1 is a decentralized economy than when it is a centralized one. This is because in
this case tax competition is already less fierce than under centralization such that the gains for
country 2 from the formation of a tax coalition are lower. By contrast, if country 1 is a low
productivity economy, tax harmonization is more beneficial for it than decentralization because
tax competition is mitigated through the direct increase of tax rates in country 2 and not only
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through the indirect response of other countries to increased vertical taxation. Again, this holds
as long as the productivity differences inside the tax coalition are not substantial.
The results in Propositions 1, 2 and 3 allow to determine under which circumstances cen-
tralization, decentralization and tax harmonization are the optimal fiscal strategy for country 1.
This gives rise to the following general result.
Proposition 4 Fiscal centralization of capital taxation occurs in economies with high income
taxation. Fiscal decentralization of capital taxation occurs i) in high productivity economies, and
ii) economies with low income taxation. Partial capital tax harmonization is more likely to occur
in i) low productivity economies with low income taxation and ii) high productivity economies
with high income taxation.
The results in Proposition 4 are illustrated in Figure 2.2. As observed in Proposition 1, coun-
try 1 decides to centralize capital taxation when it is a high income tax economy and, otherwise,
to decentralized it. Moreover, Propositions 2 and 3 show that the formation of a partial tax
coalition requires its members to have similar productivity levels such that tax harmonization is
the optimal strategy for low absolute values of ǫ. These results allow to identify different clusters
of economies with similar fiscal capital taxation strategies. Thus, high productivity countries
with low income taxation would preferably decentralize capital taxation, as can be observe, for
example, for the United States where local tax authorities have considerable freedom in setting
capital taxes. By contrast, high productivity countries with high capital taxation adopt a cen-
tralized capital taxation structure. This can be observed in Japan, for example. Finally, the
harmonization of taxes as pursued by the European Commission requires countries with similar
productivity levels. The use of structural funds in the EU to even out differences in infras-
tructure investments can be seen as an intent to reduce productivity differences among member
countries in order to facilitate tax harmonization.
As shown in Figure 2.3, the results in Proposition 4 are empirically confirmed with 2014 data
for a panel of selected OECD economies. Figure 2.3 relates the degree of capital tax decentral-
ization (or centralization) and the benefits of capital tax harmonization, respectively, to total
factor productivity and the level of labor taxation.11 The degree of capital tax decentralization
11Countries included in the analysis are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg,
Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
United Kingdom, and United States. New Zealand and Ireland have been excluded because of missing data for
one of the variables.
52
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
FISCAL HARMONIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION AND GROWING DEMAND OF MORE REGIONAL AUTONOMY 
Patricia Sanz Córdoba 
 
Chapter 2
Equilibria of the tax competition game
Figure 2.2: Equilibria are: H (partial tax harmonization), C (centralization) and D (decentral-
ization).
is approximated by the share of local and regional capital tax revenues over total capital tax
revenues. Potential gains from tax harmonization measured in percentage increases of GDP are
from Brøchner et al. (2007) who estimate welfare gains from a harmonized corporate tax rate
at 27.2 percent in the EU25. Total factor productivity levels are at current purchasing power
parities and labor tax rates are measured as non-capital tax revenues as a share of GDP. As
can be observed in the upper panel of Figure 2.3, capital tax decentralization increases with
total factor productivity and decreases with the level of labor taxation which is in line with the
first two statements in Proposition 4. Moreover, in the lower left panel of Figure 2.3 we observe
that the welfare gains from tax harmonization increase with total factor productivity for high
labor tax countries while they decrease with total factor productivity for low labor tax countries.
Overall, the lower right panel of Figure 2.3 indicates a positive relationship between the gains
from tax harmonization and the level of labor taxation. These results are totally consistent with
the last statement in Proposition 4 and what is shown in Figure 2.2.
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Data panel for a selected OECD countries (period 2014)
Figure 2.3: Countries with high levels of labor taxation are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands,
Slovenia, and Sweden (black dots). Countries with low level of labor taxation are Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Latvia,
Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, United Kingdom (grey dots). Source: Own calculation based on Brøchner et
al. (2007), Feenstra et al. (2015), and OECD (2017).
54
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
FISCAL HARMONIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION AND GROWING DEMAND OF MORE REGIONAL AUTONOMY 




Tax harmonization is a major concern in many developed economies because excessive interna-
tional tax competition has led to an erosion of capital tax bases and tax rates. For instance,
the European Commission has made considerable efforts to achieve the convergence of capital
taxation in the EU. Another tendency in capital taxation that has been observed over the last
decades in these countries is the decentralization of capital taxation as more tax autonomy has
been delegated from the central to regional and local governments. Against this background in
this chapter we built up a model that allows for both horizontal and vertical tax competition
and analyze a countries optimal fiscal strategy among: fiscal centralization, fiscal decentraliza-
tion, and partial tax harmonization. The main result from our analysis is that partial capital
taxation harmonization is more difficult to achieve in fiscally decentralized economies that are
characterized by levels of high productivity and low labor taxation. This result is confirmed by
recent data and explains the observed difficulties in achieving capital tax harmonization in the
EU.
Our results imply that a primary objective of policy makers that want to accomplish a vol-
untary harmonization of capital taxation should be to reduce productivity asymmetries between
potential tax coalition members. The current usage of structural funds in the EU which are
orientated to reduce infrastructure deficits (i.e., productivity differences) between its members
can serve, for example, as an instrument for this objective. Another handicap for tax coalition
formation is the existence of fiscal decentralization of capital taxation since tax harmonization
is easier to achieve between centralized than decentralized economies. As a consequence, policy
makers should advocate for the usage of other than capital taxes to finance the needs of lower-tier
governments in fiscally decentralized economies.
Our analysis is based on a highly stylized model. Therefore, some final comments regarding
the robustness of the results are indicated. First, we have considered a three-country model
with two jurisdictions in each. However, the main insights from our analysis can be generalized
straightforwardly to the case with more countries and jurisdictions. On the one hand, with
more countries, horizontal tax competition becomes more fierce such that the formation of a tax
coalition among two (or more) countries will be more difficult to achieve in general. On the other
hand, with more jurisdictions inside a country horizontal tax competition between jurisdictions
is more intense such that vertical tax competition is less fierce which facilitates partial tax
55
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
FISCAL HARMONIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION AND GROWING DEMAND OF MORE REGIONAL AUTONOMY 
Patricia Sanz Córdoba 
 
Chapter 2
harmonization. By contrast, with more than two tiers of government the negative externality of
vertical tax competition becomes larger and, consequently, partial tax harmonization is harder
to accomplish.
Second, following the literature, we have assumed that labor taxes are exogenously given.
We have observed that in this case partial tax harmonization is easier to achieve under high
labor taxation. However, a consequence of a tax harmonization agreement will be a shift from
more capital to less labor taxation inside the tax coalition. Our results indicate that this might
turn the tax coalition agreement unstable because high productivity economies prefer fiscal
decentralization in such a case. It follows that tax harmonization between countries with multi-
level governments is even more difficult to achieve with endogenous labor taxation than under
the assumptions in this paper.
Finally, we have assumed that one country chooses between fiscal centralization and decen-
tralization while the other countries are centralized economies. A generalization of the analysis
in this direction certainly would require some additional assumptions on the model parameters
to keep the analysis tractable and is left for future research. However, our results can be gen-
eralized to the case in which there are differences in the degree of capital tax decentralization
among countries. Our results indicate that economies with high productivity levels and low labor
taxation are more decentralized than others and that the formation of a tax coalition with these
countries is more difficult to achieve. Another possible direction for an extension of the analysis
is to consider simultaneous tax competition with other nontax instruments (e.g. infrastructure
investments).
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Proof of the results in Section 2.3. Making use of τir ≡ Ti + tir, the amount of capital




(γi − 5τir + τis + τjr + τjs + τhr + τhs) . (2.21)





























τis = 0, (2.22)
i, j, h = 1, 2, 3; j 6= i, h 6= i, j; r, s = 1, 2; r 6= s. Notice, that these are sufficient conditions for
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9b2
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(3− 2χ) 3 (3γi + γj + γh)− 2χ (γ1 + γ2 + γ3)
5− 2χ , (2.23)




(3− 2χ) b . (2.24)
From Eqs. (2.9) and (2.24) we observe that sufficient conditions for positive tax revenues and











χ. Finally, a sufficiently large guarantees positive net returns to capital in
equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that all countries increase their tax rates by a small amount λ
such that τ ∗ir = τ
C
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which proves the statement.
Proof of the results in Section 2.4. Considering that economies 2 and 3 are central-
ized such that only the consolidated tax rates can be determined, the amount of capital invested








(γi − 5τir + τis + 2T1 + t11 + t12 + τjr + τjs) , i, j = 2, 3, j 6= i.
The first-order conditions corresponding to Eqs. (2.10) - (2.12) are
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τis = 0, (2.27)
i, j = 2, 3; j 6= i; r = 1, 2. Again, these are sufficient conditions for a maximum as the second-
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3 (3γ1 + γ2 + γ3)− 2χ (γ1 + γ2 + γ3)









3 (45γ1+103γi+37γj)−4χ (26γ1+41γi+26γj)+20χ2 (γ1+γ2+γ3)
(5− 2χ) (33− 10χ) , (2.30)
i, j = 2, 3; j 6= i; r = 1, 2, such that
τ1r = T1 + t1r =
1
36
(27− 10χ) 3 (3γ1 + γ2 + γ3)− 2χ (γ1 + γ2 + γ3)
33− 10χ . (2.31)








(3− 2χ) b , i = 2, 3. (2.32)
Substituting γ1 = b+ 4ǫ and γ2 = γ3 = b− 2ǫ in Eqs. (2.30) and (2.31), we get the equilibrium
tax rates in (2.13) and (2.14).
From Eqs. (2.15) and (2.32) we observe that sufficient conditions for positive tax revenues















χ. Again, a sufficiently large guarantees positive net returns to capital in
equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 2. From Eqs. (2.8) and (2.13) we obtain
τD
1r − τC1r =
1
3
(9− 2χ) 5b+ 8ǫ− 2bχ




which proves the first part of the first statement.




1r+λ (with λ > 0) but that countries 2 and 3 maintain their tax rates at τ
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ir . Then, using
the fact that capital investments in country 1 can be written as k̃D
1r = k
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. The reaction of countries 2 and 3 to such an unilateral increase in tax rates in
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reduction of capital investments by
kD
1r − kC1r = −
4λ
b (9− 2χ)
which is increasing in χ, which proves the second part of the first statement.








(1− 2χ) (27− 10χ) (5b+ 8ǫ− 2bχ)
2
b (5− 2χ)2 (33− 10χ)2
T 0 iff χ S 1
2
and, noticing that τDir > τ
C
ir , from Eqs. (2.9) and (2.15)









> 0, i = 2, 3.
Proof of the results in Section 2.5. Making use of τc ≡ τ1r ≡ T1 + t1r ≡ τ2r ≡ T2 + t2r, the








(γ3 − 5τ3r + τ3s + 4τc) , r, s = 1, 2. (2.34)
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9b
τc = 0 (2.35)
∂TR3
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τ3s = 0, (2.36)
r, s = 1, 2; s 6= r. Again, these are sufficient conditions for a maximum as the second-order

























4 (2− χ) (3− χ)
9b2
> 0.
Solving the system of equations in (2.35) and (2.36) yields the equilibrium tax rates
τc =






(3− 2χ) 3 (γ1 + γ2 + 2γ3)− χ (γ1 + γ2 + γ3)
3− χ , r = 1, 2 (2.38)




(3− χ) (γi − γj) + τc




(3− 2χ) b , r = 1, 2. (2.40)
Finally, substituting γ1 = b + 4ǫ and γ2 = γ3 = b − 2ǫ in Eq. (2.37) and (2.38), we get the
equilibrium tax rates in (2.18). As positive tax rates and capital revenues imply that tax revenues




3r > 0 (which implies k3r > 0). From Eqs.(2.18) and (2.40) follows that this is guaranteed








+ χ < ǫ
b
< 2 − 1
2







. Again, a sufficiently large guarantees positive net returns to capital in
equilibrium.
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Proof of Lemma 3. From Eqs. (2.8) and (2.18) we obtain that
τHc − τC1r =
1
6
5b− 7ǫ− 2bχ + 6ǫχ







τHc − τC2r =
1
6
5b+ 11ǫ− 2bχ− 6ǫχ
5− 2χ > 0 iff
ǫ
b
> − 5− 2χ
11− 6χ













(3− 2χ) 5b+ 2ǫ− 2bχ











∈ R. Finally, from Eq. (2.18) we observe that

































(3− χ) (5− 2χ)2
ǫ
b
τc R 0 for ǫ R 0.
Therefore, partial tax harmonization takes place whenever the less productive country gains








for ǫ > 0. From Eqs. (2.9) and
(2.19) this yields
(2− χ) (21− 8χ) (5− 2χ)2
+4 (5− 2χ)
(









> 0 for ǫ < 0 (2.41)
and
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(2− χ) (21− 8χ) (5− 2χ)2
−4 (5− 2χ)
(









> 0 for ǫ > 0. (2.42)





where f1 (χ) is the upper root of Eq. (2.41) and f2 (χ) is the lower root of Eq. (2.42). Figure
2.4 displays the areas in which partial tax harmonization (H) and centralization (C) are revenue







Proof of Proposition 3. Partial tax harmonization increases the consolidated tax revenues
of the tax coalition members when TRHi − TRDi > 0, for i = 1, 2. From Eqs. (2.15) and (2.19)
















> 0 and (2.43)
5166− 9711χ+ 6204χ2 − 1660χ3 + 160χ4
−4
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where g1 (χ) is the upper root of Eq. (2.43) and g2 (χ) is the lower root of Eq. (2.44). Figure 2.5
displays the areas in which partial tax harmonization (H) and decentralization (D) are revenue
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Equilibria under centralization and partial tax harmonization
Figure 2.4: Equilibria are: H (partial tax harmonization), and C (centralization).
Equilibria under fiscal decentralization and partial tax harmonization
Figure 2.5: Equilibria are: H (partial tax harmonization), and D (decentralization).
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former two conditions are guaranteed by the third one. Therefore, the relevant region with
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NEW EVIDENCE ON FISCAL INTERACTIONS
Overview. This chapter evaluates the existence of international tax com-
petition among OECD countries using the spatial panel data model. We
test whether fiscal interactions between governments exist and whether
governments with similar public infrastructure investment levels increase
these fiscal interdependence among them. Results indicate the existence
of tax interdependence in the closest neighboring OECD countries where
international tax competition occurs. These tax interactions are higher
for countries with similar public infrastructure investment levels.
Keywords: International Tax Competition; Public Investment; Fiscal
Interactions; Spatial Panel Data model; OECD.
71
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
FISCAL HARMONIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION AND GROWING DEMAND OF MORE REGIONAL AUTONOMY 




The processes of economic integration have increased international mobility of capital over the
last three decades. This has led to a race to the bottom in capital taxation with inefficiently low
levels of capital tax rates and the underprovision of public goods (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986;
Wilson, 1986; Bucovetsky, 1991). Consequently, the tax burden has been shifted from capital
towards labor to maintain a certain level of public good provision. As a response to increasing
tax competition, the literature has focused on the coordination of capital taxation (Bucovetsky,
1991; Kanbur and Keen, 1993; Fuest and Huber, 2001; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Konrad,
2009; Devereux and Fuest, 2010; Keen and Konrad, 2013). It is generally recognized that global
tax harmonization is difficult to achieve. Therefore, the conditions that allow for partial tax
harmonization among a group of countries have been widely discussed (Konrad and Schjelderup,
1999; Burbidge et al., 1997; Brøchner et al., 2007; Bucovetsky, 2009; Vrijburg and De Mooij,
2010).
This chapter has two main objectives. First, we address the question whether or not fiscal
interactions between OECD governments exists. There are three main theoretical explanations
why countries heeds its neighborings’ fiscal decisions. The first explanation is the existence of
international tax competition among OECD countries.1 Governments reduce capital taxation
to attract foreign capital. The empirical analysis of tax competition has become an important
issue in the literature (Besley et al., 2001; Cassette and Paty, 2008; Devereux et al., 2008).
Both the European Union (EU) and the OECD have introduced initiatives in the late 1990s
designed to combat “harmful” tax competition (Devereux et al., 2008).2 Therefore, analyzing
the intensity of tax competition among OECD countries would help policy makers to develop
better actions against these harmful practices. The second explanation is that voters judge their
governments by comparing their performance with those of neighbor countries (denominated
yardstick competition). As a consequence, governments mimic the fiscal decisions applied by their
neighbors (Besley and Case, 1995; Besley and Smart, 2007; Bordignon et al., 2003). Finally,
the existence of expenditure externalities on public investments in core infrastructures (e.g.
transport and communications) whose benefits have spillover effects on neighboring countries can
diminish their level of investments due to free riding (Redoano, 2014). Accordingly, the analysis
1OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
2See, for example, the Code of Conduct from the European Commission (1997) and Harmful Tax Competition:
An Emerging Global Issue from the OECD (1998) as two initiatives to curb harmful tax practices.
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of fiscal interdependence among OECD countries is rather complex because it is simultaneously
caused by these three processes: tax competition, yardstick competition, and spillover effects.
We focus on fiscal interactions in terms of corporate tax choices because fiscal interactions are
more likely to affect capital than labor due to its greater mobility.
Second, we test the theoretical assumption that countries with similar public investment
levels incur in higher fiscal interdependence. Many authors argue that jurisdictions compete
not only in taxes but also in the provision of infrastructure (see Hindriks et al., 2008; Zissimos
and Wooders, 2008; Pieretti and Zanaj, 2011). Some institutions have increased the level of
infrastructure in order to ensure some similarity on the level of public investment between
countries. For example, the European Commission has created the European Structural and
Investment Funds to support economic development across all EU member countries from 2014
to 2020 (European Commission, 2017). In this case, governments can be more likely to set
similar tax policies if they have similar investment levels. Therefore, fiscal interdependence will
increase if countries share certain similarities in their levels of public investments.
For this purpose, we use a spatial panel data model from Elhorst (2010) which has been
widely used in the literature. This model allows testing for contemporaneous fiscal interactions
(Besley and Case, 1995; Cassette and Paty, 2008; Devereux, et al., 2008; Redoano, 2014). The
weighting matrix used to model the relationship between countries is the geographical distance.
Moreover, in order to test whether public investment plays a role in international tax competition
among OECD countries, a specific matrix is constructed.
The main results of the chapter can be summarized as follows. We confirm the existence of tax
interdependence in the closest neighboring OECD countries where international tax competition
occurs. This fiscal interdependence is higher for countries with similar public investments levels
and this weighting scheme seems more appropriate to model corporate tax rate interactions.
Therefore, we can accept the hypothesis that countries with similar public investment levels
incur in higher fiscal interactions.
The analysis is most related to the following literature. First, on the one hand, the existence
of contemporaneous strategic fiscal interactions between countries is analyzed theoretically and
empirically (Cassette and Paty, 2008; Devereux et al., 2008; Deskins and Hill, 2010; Redoano,
2014; Altshuler et al., 2015; Reiter, 2015; Streif, 2015; among others). These authors find
positive fiscal interdependence among the studied countries. The main focus of these studies is
international tax competition. Yardstick competition, on the other hand, is tested among states
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or municipalities (see for example Bordignon et al. (2003) for Italian municipalities or Duvois
and Paty (2010) for French municipalities who find positive local fiscal interactions). Second,
Hauptmeier et al. (2012) estimate a model of strategic fiscal interactions in both tax and public
investments for local governments. They find that governments use both capital taxation and
public infrastructure investment to compete for international capital.
The main difference of the model to those of the literature is that it tests fiscal interactions
between countries that have similar infrastructure investment levels. To the best of my knowl-
edge, this is the first empirical analysis of international tax competition that allows the inclusion
of for public infrastructure investment in fiscal interactions.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follow. Section 3.2 presents the theoretical
model of tax and public investments competition, Section 3.3 describes the estimation approach,
Section 3.4 shows the data used in the model, and results are shown in Section 3.5. Finally,
Section 3.6 concludes. Tables of the results are in the Appendix.
3.2 Theoretical model
Fiscal competition models can be presented following the essence of a simple model of tax
competition. The model is built on the strategic tax competition literature such as Zodrow
and Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson (1986), and Wildasin (1991). In these models, governments
compete for capital using taxes as a policy instrument. Consider a federation of two asymmetric
jurisdictions, indexed by N = i, j, each inhabited by an identical number of immobile residents
with mass one who each supply one unit of labor. Each jurisdiction produces a homogeneous
consumption good using a mobile capital ki and a publicly provided input, gi. The total amount
of capital is fixed and normalized to one. The cost of public investment is convex and is given by
ci(gi) = (kigi)
2/2. Moreover, each jurisdiction chooses a source-based unit capital tax ti, capable
of influencing the location of mobile capital per worker ki. The simple quadratic production
function is




where ai is the productivity level parameter of the jurisdiction i and b the curvature of the
production function parameter. The output fulfill with the standard assumptions of F ′i (ki; gi) >
0, F ′′i (ki; gi) < 0. As capital is mobile, the net return to capital, ρ, is determined by
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ρ = F ′i (ki; gi)− ti, (3.2)
such that ρ across jurisdictions is equalized,
F ′i (ki; gi)− ti = F ′j(kj; gj)− tj . (3.3)





(b+ ai − aj + gi − gj − ti + tj)
2b
(3.4)
where i 6= j. Governments maximize the welfare function Ui in their own jurisdictions, the
sum of the return to the immobile factor and tax revenue, net of public good cost3















(2ti − g2i )), (3.6)
where δi ≡ b+ ai − aj + gi− gj − ti + tj . The main interest of this section is the slopes of the
tax reaction functions, ti = ft(tj ; gi; gj; | gi − gj |), around the equilibrium. An optimal policy
change of a government would be capital tax that takes into account the competitors responses
who use both taxes and public inputs. To obtain the slopes of tax rates, the government’s first
order conditions with respect to ti are differentiated. The reaction function of ti is
t1 = (b+ g
2
i )
b+ ai − aj + gi − gj + tj
3b+ g2i
, (3.7)














3The government objective function is widely used in the literature, for example Hindriks et al. (2008) and
Hauptmeier et al. (2012). Including the cost of public input provision in the welfare function us justified in
Hauptmeier et al. (2012).
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The upward sloping of ∂ti/∂tj in Eq. (3.8) shows that if the competitor decreases its capital
tax rates, the optimal respond of the government would be also a decrease of its own taxation.
The reaction function depends on the curvature of the production function and on its public
input. The expression ∂ti/∂gi in Eq. (3.8) denotes that an increase in the level of public good
in jurisdiction i also increases in its level of capital taxation. Moreover, it depends on the
levels of the productivity of both jurisdictions and negatively on the competitor public input
level. Evaluating ∂ti/∂gj in Eq. (3.9), the reaction function is downward sloping. This means
that if the opponent deviates from the equilibrium by increasing its level of public input, the
jurisdiction will decrease its capital taxation as an optimal response but to a lower extent. This
response does not depend on the level of jurisdictions’ productivity level. Finally, the difference
between the level of public input provision’s reaction function, i.e., ∂ti/∂ | gi − gj |, in Eq. (3.9)
is positive. This means that when jurisdictions share similar levels of public inputs, jurisdiction
i decreases its capital taxation more than before as an unique instrument for attracting more
capital than its competitor.
3.3 Empirical model
In this section, the empirical methodology is presented. The literature on fiscal strategic interac-
tions among governments agrees that the spatial panel data models are theoretically consistent
in situations where capital taxation and public infrastructure investments interact with those
of neighboring countries (Brueckner 2003). Therefore, a spatial panel data model from Elhorst
(2010) that accounts for contemporaneous cross-sectional dependence is used in this case
yn,t = λWnyn,t +Xn,tβ + vn + εn,t (3.10)
where yn,t is the n × 1 vector of corporate tax rates for the n countries at time t, Xn,t is
the n × k matrix containing specific control variables at time t for the n countries, vn is a
n × 1 vector of country fixed effects, and εn,t is a vector of error term which is assumed to be
normally distributed. Wn is the weighting matrix used to model interactions between countries.
The choice of Wn is discussed below. Wnyn,t is the spatially lagged variable. It measures the
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(potential) contemporaneous interactions among tax decisions across countries. Therefore, λ
measures the intensity of the contemporaneous interactions. Starting from this general model,
we can conclude that fiscal interactions exist only when λ is significant. Non significance of λ
indicates that the use of spatial econometrics is not appropriate.
The weighting matrix is used to model the relationship between countries. It is composed
of elements wi,j that measure the link between country i and country j. More specifically, each
weight wi,j measures the impact of country j on country i. In the case of tax interactions, the
weighting matrix models the transmission channels between the implementation of tax policy in
each country. A high wi,j assumes that fiscal choices of country j strongly affect the fiscal choices
in country i. Estimating Eq. (3.10) using a specific weighting matrix allows to conclude that
there are (no) interactions between countries that pass through the specific channel modeled by
the matrix.
A way to model interactions between corporate tax rates among governments is using the
geographical distance. First, countries that are close are more likely to be competitors for
international capital investments. Second, the closer countries are, the stronger commercial
relationships they have, such that the probability of international tax competition between
neighbor countries is significantly higher. Another advantage of using the geographical distance
to construct the weighting matrix is that it is fully exogenous. To measure the geographical
distance, the radial distance between capitals of countries i and j (di,j) is used. Moreover, to
test the robustness of the estimation, three matrices are constructed. The first one considers the
inverse distance between countries: the closer countries are, the stronger the associated weight





With the second matrix, another functional form is considered to model the geographical
distance: We use the exponential distance. Each element is computed as follow
wi,j = exp(−di,j). (3.12)
Finally, consider only the 5-nearest neighbors: wi,j takes the value 1/di,j if j is one of the
five nearest neighbors of i, 0 otherwise.
If the coefficient associated to the spatially lagged variable Wnyn,t is not significant, this
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means that there are not tax interactions between countries according to the weighting schemes
used. In contrast, if the coefficient associated to the spatially lagged variableWnyn,t is significant,
this means that countries interact more with close neighbors than with other countries. A
positive coefficient implies that there is a degree of interdependence among countries. Therefore,
countries increase their corporate tax rates when neighbor countries do so.
The estimation of Eq. (3.10) requires the normalization of the weighting matrix. Therefore,
each matrix is row-normalized. This means the transformed variable Wnyn,t can be interpreted
as the average of the y values in neighboring countries at time t.
3.4 Data
The dataset comprises annual data for 22 OECD economies over the period 1996 to 2014.4
Further details on data measurement and sources can be found in Table 3.1. Table 3.2 reports
the descriptive statistics.
The endogenous variable is corporate tax rates (Tax ). This measure has been widely used in
the literature of fiscal interactions (Keen and Simone, 2004; Cassette and Paty, 2008; Devereux
et al., 2008; Cassette et al., 2013; Redoano, 2014). Measuring tax competition by corporate tax
rates has the advantage of being easily accessible and, moreover, it is commonly recognized that
it plays an important role in the international tax competition. We use combined (statutory)
corporate income tax rates as percentage units from the OECD Tax database. Thereby, our
dependent variable is broadly available in a comparable format.
To estimate fiscal interactions between OECD governments, we include two sets of control
variables: socio-economic factors, and political factors. The first set include variables such as
gross domestic product per capita (GDP), total inland transport infrastructure investment per
capita (Investment), the unemployment rate (Unemployment), public debt (Debt), and trade
openness (Trade).5 Regarding GDP, the expected effect is ambiguous. The sign for GDP is
negative if countries use higher levels of wealth to reduce their corporate tax rates, otherwise,
the sign should be positive. Invest is used to control for the nontax instruments that governments
use in the tax competition. An increase in public investments is expected to decrease corporate
4Countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
5Missing values for the variable Investment where imputed using the values of the former period. These were
in Portugal at 2011 and 2014, and in Japan and Switzerland at 2014.
78
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
FISCAL HARMONIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION AND GROWING DEMAND OF MORE REGIONAL AUTONOMY 
Patricia Sanz Córdoba 
 
Chapter 3
tax rates. This is because governments would use both capital taxation and infrastructure
investments as an instruments to attract capital investments. The sign of Unemployment is
also expected to be ambiguous. On the one hand, if Unemployment increases governments
would need more tax revenues because of the fiscal stress. On the other hand, the increase of
Unemployment would encourage governments to use their fiscal policy to be more aggressive in
attracting capital and, therefore, they would decrease corporate taxation. A high value of Debt
is expected to increase corporate taxation because governments face higher revenue requirements
Countries with more Trade are expected to decrease their corporate tax rates since they are more
heavily engaged in international tax competition.
The second set of variables contains: membership in the Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU ), the ideology of the leading party in government (Left), and the date of election (Elec-
tion). EMU takes the value 1 for countries that belong to the Euro Area, and 0 otherwise.
Countries that form part of the EMU are expected to have less corporate tax rates because
mobility costs of capital are lower within the EU where the degree of international tax compe-
tition is significantly higher. Left is introduced to control for the ideology of the leading party
in the government as it is often argued that left-wing parties rely more on corporate taxation
to increase public revenues than right-wing parties (Profeta and Scabrosetti, 2016). Alluding to
Election, it is expected that governments reduce corporate tax rates in order to attract some
voters and to increase their re-election probability. However, as corporate taxation is a contro-
versial issue the effect might be rather small. Referring to Franzese (2000), the date of elections
is quantified as
Election =
(M − 1) + d/D
12
(3.13)
where M and d are respectively the month and the day of an election, and D is the total
number of days in the election month. Note that Election = 0 for years without elections. The
model is also estimated with a common trend in order to ensure that interactions are not only
due to a coincidence or to common changes among countries.
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In what follows, the results on fiscal interactions between governments using the three weighting
schemes presented above are discussed. Results are represented in Table 3.3. For each weighting
matrix, the two left columns shows the results without a Trend, and the two right ones depict the
results with a Trend. All matrices give very similar results, in terms of sign and of the estimates.
Trend has a negative coefficient and is statistically significant for all weighting matrices. This
result reveals that corporate tax rates decrease 2% on average for all countries per year. This
is consistent with the existence of a race to the bottom in corporate taxation among OECD
countries.
Regarding the spatial correlation all weighting matrices show that there are positive contem-
poraneous fiscal interactions. This means that governments’ corporate tax rates depend posi-
tively on their neighbors’ corporate tax rates. When a neighbor countries increases (decreases)
its corporate tax rate (due to higher demand for public spending, for example), governments
do the same. As it is shown in Eq. (3.8) in Section 3.2, the reaction function in tax rates ti is
positive with respect to tj, proving that tax rates are strategic complements. This is compatible
with the existence of the international tax competition. GDP is only significant when Trend
is included in the model and impacts positively on Tax. As expected. Unemployment is not
significant and does not have an effect on Tax. Debt positively affects Tax. Governments have
higher revenue requirements when they have higher levels of public debt and, consequently, in-
crease corporate tax rates. Trade has a significant negative effect on Tax. Countries with higher
trade openess have less mobility costs. Therefore, international tax competition is more fierce
and countries are forced to decrease capital taxation.
Concerning the political variables included in the estimations, Election does not have an
impact on Tax. However, Left has a significantly positive effect on Tax. This result confirms
that left-wing parties rely more on corporate taxation to increase public revenues than right-wing
parties. EMU also impacts positively on Tax if a common trend is included (with exception
to the exponential distance). This result reveals that forming part of the European Monetary
Union increases corporate taxation, which is contrary to what is expected.
Interestingly, Investment has a significant negative effect on Tax. When governments increase
their level of infrastructure investment, at the same time, they decrease the level of corporate tax
rates. Note that this finding is well in line with the evidence presented in Eq. (3.9) in Section
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3.2. This result confirms that governments compete in both capital taxation and the provision
of infrastructure (Hindriks et al., 2008; Zissimos and Wooders, 2008; Pieretti and Zanaj, 2011).
From a tax competition perspective, we observe that fiscal interactions are higher if countries
have similar infrastructure investment levels. Therefore, it is important to analyze whether
fiscal interactions increase when countries are similar in nontax instruments (e.g., infrastructure
investment levels).
To test if governments with similar infrastructure investment levels have higher fiscal in-
teractions, a weighting matrix is constructed that accounts for the distance in terms of public





We consider the average of public infrastructure investment in 1995 (which is before the beginning
of the estimation period) to avoid endogeneity problems.
Estimations are represented in Table 3.4. The results are similar to the ones obtained with
the geographical weighting distance matrices. Thus, we find positive fiscal contemporaneous
interactions. It reveals that countries with similar public investment levels incur in fiscal in-
terdependence between their neighbors. From Eq. (3.9) we find that when jurisdictions share
similar public input provision, the jurisdiction i decreases its capital taxation in order to be
more competitive. Therefore, fiscal interactions are more aggressive between these jurisdictions.
Moreover, the coefficients associated to the spatially lagged variables are higher than the geo-
graphical distance weighting matrices, meaning that this weighting scheme seems to be more
appropriate to model corporate tax interactions. Thus, countries with similar public investment
levels incur in higher fiscal interdependence than with countries geographically close. Finally, as
it was expected, the other explanatory variables maintain the same coefficients and significance.
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The coordination of capital taxation has been an important issue for both politicians and
economists because of inefficiently high international tax competition. As the global harmo-
nization of capital tax rates is difficult to achieve, the literature has focused on the conditions
that allow partial tax harmonization. This chapter tests the existence of fiscal interactions among
OECD countries, whether or not fiscal interactions are caused by international tax competition,
and if fiscal interactions increase when countries have similar levels of public infrastructure in-
vestments. We fins that governments compete in both capital taxation and public infrastructure
investments in order to attract capital. This fiscal interdependence is higher for countries with
similar public investment levels. Therefore, this weighting scheme seems more appropriate to
model corporate tax rates interactions. Moreover, we accept the hypothesis that countries with
similar public investment levels have higher fiscal interactions in corporate tax rates.
The results imply that, as fiscal interactions are higher for countries with similar public
investments, policy makers should focus more to accomplish tax harmonization between the
OECD members. The similarity of infrastructure investments can be an instrument to carry
out this objective. Sanz-Córdoba & Theilen (2016) show that the coordination of infrastructure
investments (i.e. similar levels of public investments) leads countries to be more likely to achieve
tax harmonization. Therefore, this might help to reduce the fierce international tax competition
that governments are dealing with currently.
Regarding lines of further research, it would be interesting to analyze spatially lagged control
variables in order to add new information about the variables that affect corporate tax rates
and the interactions of these variables between countries. Taking into account different policy
instruments could yield further insights into the rather complex process of fiscal policy decision
making at the macro level. Additionally, it would be interesting to analyze a spatial dynamic
panel data model including both contemporaneous and time-delayed fiscal interactions.
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Table 3.1: Data definitions and sources
Variables Definition Measurement Source
Tax Combined (statutory) corpo-
rate income tax rates




Investment Total inland transport infras-
tructure investment
Investment per inhabitant
at constant hundreds Euro




GDP Gross domestic product per
capita
Per capita in constant thou-
sands US dollars, in logar-
itms.
World Bank (2016a); World
Development Indicators.
Unemployment Unemployment rate Percentage points of total
working force, in logaritms.
Ameco (2016); OECD
(2016c).
Debt Public debt Percentage of GDP, in logar-
itms.
IMF (2016); Historical Public
Debt database (HPDD).
Trade Exports and imports as share
of GDP
Percentage of GDP, in logar-
itms.
World Bank (2016a); World
Development Indicators.
Election Date of election Date of election as time share
over year in election years, 0
in years without elections.
Döring and Manow (2011);
Parliament and government
composition database (Par-
Gov); Data for the USA
is from Benoit and Laver
(2006).
Left Ideology of the leading party
in government
Between 1 (hegemony of
right-wing parties) to 5 (hege-
mony of social-democratic
and left-wing parties).
Klaus et al. (2015); Compar-
ative Political dataset.
EMU Economic and Monetary
Union of the European Union
countries
Dummy variable. 1 = coun-
try belongs to EMU, 0 other-
whise.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Tax 29.76 7.87 12.5 56.79
Investment 6.02 8.56 0.04 53.55
GDP 35.73 10.35 11.98 65.07
Unemployment 7.85 3.87 2.24 26.09
Debt 63.09 37.57 9.68 246.17
Trade 83.30 38.39 18.76 209.08
Election 0.15 0.27 0 0.96
Left 2.55 1.51 1 5
EMU 0.35 0.49 0 1
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Table 3.3: Results using geographical distance weighting matrices-Row-normalization
Inverse Distance Exponential Distance 5-nearest neighbors
Variables Coefficient (Std. Error)
W*Tax 0.15 (0.01)*** 0.14 (0.01)*** 0.14 (0.01)*** 0.13 (0.01)*** 0.13 (0.03)*** 0.12 (0.02)***
Investment -0.02 (0.00)** -0.02 (0.01)** -0.02 (0.01)** -0.02 (0.01)** -0.02 (0.01)** -0.02 (0.01)***
GDP -0.08 (0.04)* 0.04 (0.04) -0.07 (0.04)† 0.04 (0.04) -0.04 (0.04) 0.08 (0.04)*
Unemployment -0.03 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) -0.03 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) -0.03 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03)
Debt 0.07 (0.02)*** 0.08 (0.02)*** 0.07 (0.02)*** 0.09 (0.02)*** 0.08 (0.02)*** 0.10 (0.02)***
Trade -0.29 (0.03)*** -0.24 (0.03)*** -0.30 (0.03)*** -0.26 (0.03)*** -0.35 (0.03)*** -0.31 (0.03)***
Election -0.01 (0.03) 0.00 (0.03) -0.01 (0.04) 0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.04) 0.01 (0.03)
Left 0.02 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.01)† 0.02 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.01)† 0.02 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.01)†
EMU 0.02 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02)† 0.02 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02)† 0.03 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02)*
Trend - -0.02 (0.00)*** - -0.02 (0.00)*** - -0.02 (0.00)***
Number of observations: 418. The model include individual fixed effects. ***Significant at 0.1 percent, **Significant at 1 percent, *Significant
at 5 percent, and † Significant at 10 percent.89
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Table 3.4: Results using investment distance weighting matrix
Distance in investment levels
Variables Coefficient (Std. Error)
W*Tax 0.17 (0.02)*** 0.18 (0.02)***
Investment -0.02 (0.01)* -0.02 (0.01)**
GDP -0.06 (0.04)† 0.05 (0.04)
Unemployment -0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02)
Debt 0.07 (0.02)*** 0.08 (0.02)***
Trade -0.31 (0.03)*** -0.25 (0.02)***
Election 0.00 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03)
Left 0.01 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.01)
EMU 0.02 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02)†
Trend - -0.02 (0.00)***
Number of observations: 418. The model include individual fixed effects. ***Significant at 0.1
percent, **Significant at 1 percent, *Significant at 5 percent, and † Significant at 10 percent.
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